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Abstract
We present a novel theoretical mechanism that explains how nonenforceable communication about
future actions has the capacity to improve efficiency. We explore a two-player partnership game where
each player, before choosing a level of effort to exert on a joint project, makes a cheap talk promise
to his partner about his own future effort. We allow agents to incur a psychological cost of reneging
on their promises. We demonstrate a strong tendency for evolutionary processes to select agents
who incur intermediate costs of reneging, and show that these intermediate costs induce second-best
optimal outcomes.
Keywords: Promises, strategic complements, lying costs, input games, partnership games.
JEL Classification: C73, D03, D83.
1 Introduction
Communication about future actions in joint projects is pervasive in the household, within and between
firms, in political processes, and in casual day-to-day interactions. Often, agents can make statements
about their intentions, both as a means of coordination and as a promise. Frequently, they are not
contractually bound by these statements and have an incentive to make false promises and renege upon
them when choosing how to act. Nevertheless, agents in such circumstances commonly use communica-
tion to carry out courses of action that yield a higher payoff to each than would be expected if agents
could make and break promises at no direct cost (cheap talk). Consider, for example, two coauthors
initiating a project and making promises about the number of hours they will separately work on it in
the following year, or countries making commitments to reduce regional levels of pollution.
Our two key contributions are as follows. First, we present a novel theoretical foundation for the
prevalence of intermediate psychological costs of breaking promises (reneging). Second, we demonstrate
that these endogenously determined intermediate psychological costs yield second-best optimal outcomes
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in an important class of strategic interactions. Taken together, these contributions present a novel
explanation for the way in which preplay communication can foster cooperation in one-shot strategic
interactions when agents’ interests are only partially aligned.
The possibility of repeated interaction with a partner means that reputational concerns could mo-
tivate agents to keep their promises, even when this does not maximise their payoff in the present
encounter. However, the experimental evidence discussed in Section 2, and indeed much of daily experi-
ence, demonstrates that agents are motivated to some extent to keep their word even in one-off encounters
and suggests a direct concern for keeping promises. In this paper, we put reputational concerns to one
side and consider this second, direct motivation for promise-keeping.
General Partnership Game
We study a general class of partnership games (also known as input games; see, e.g., Holmstrom, 1982;
Cooper & John, 1988) with cheap talk preplay communication. In the setting we examine, agents
simultaneously communicate promised levels of effort, and, following this, they simultaneously choose
their levels of effort. We make two mild assumptions about the material payoffs of the agents: (1) the
payoff of each agent is weakly increasing in his partner’s effort, and (2) the payoff function encourages
“shirking” above some effort level c: the best reply to his partner exerting effort x > c is for the
agent to exert less effort than his partner. Lemma 1 shows that any game with strategic complements
encourages shirking above the highest symmetric Nash equilibrium effort level (see, e.g., Example 1 of
price competition with differentiated goods).
We explore the impact of introducing into this setting a direct cost of reneging on promises. Specif-
ically, we consider an arbitrary reneging cost function that satisfies the following two mild assumptions:
(1) the reneging cost is weakly increasing in the difference between the promised level of effort in the
first stage and the exerted level of effort in the second stage, and (2) any nonzero difference between
promised and exerted effort induces a positive cost. Next, we endow each agent i with a level of reneging
aversion λi ≥ 0 (which is observed by his partner). The subjective payoff of each agent i is equal to the
material payoff (which depends on the levels of exerted effort) minus λi times the reneging cost.
Nonintermediate Costs Induce Zero Effort
Our first result (Proposition 1) shows that agents exert low effort of at most c in any equilibrium of
the partnership game whenever the reneging costs are either too low or too high. The intuition is
as follows. Too low reneging costs induce too little commitment power and, as a result, each agent
undercuts his partner’s effort in the second round, regardless of the promise. Too high reneging costs do
not leave enough flexibility for the second round, making agents unwilling to promise effort. Specifically,
each agent in the second round exerts a level of effort very close to his own promise, regardless of the
partner’s promise. This, in turn, implies that each agent undercuts his partner’s promise in the first
round, which implies that the agents promise effort of at most c in the first round, and exert effort of at
most c in the second round. Thus, only when both agents have intermediate levels of reneging costs it
is possible to induce effort above c and to have a successful partnership.
2
Partnership Game with Quadratic Payoffs
For tractability, we focus in the subsequent analysis on a specific family of quadratic payoff functions
that satisfy: (I) a convex material cost of exerting effort, (II) a convex intrinsic cost of promising an
effort different from the exerted effort, and (III) strategic complementarity between the effort levels of
the two players. Specifically, we assume that (1) the material payoff of each agent is equal to the product
of the two efforts minus a cost that is proportional to the square of the agent’s exerted effort, and (2) the
reneging cost is proportional to the square of the difference between the promised effort and the exerted
effort. We further assume that the set of feasible effort levels is a bounded interval.
In Theorem 1 we fully characterise the set of perfect equilibria of the partnership game. It turns
out that the partnership game, essentially, admits a unique perfect equilibrium, and that the properties
of this unique equilibrium depend on which of three regions the pair of the players’ levels of reneging
aversion belongs to (as demonstrated in Figure 2 in Section 4.4).
1. There is a convex symmetric region where both players have an intermediate level of reneging
aversion and the unique equilibrium is for both players to promise maximal effort (maximum-
message equilibrium); in the second stage both players exert positive levels of effort. The intuition
is as follows. The indirect benefit of promising a higher level of effort than his partner does
(“overcutting,” which induces his partner to exert more effort in the second stage) is increasing
in the player’s reneging aversion (as his promise is more credible), and decreasing in the partner’s
reneging aversion (as a higher level of reneging aversion gives the partner less flexibility to respond
to the agent’s promise). Thus, the indirect benefit is sufficiently large to induce an agent to overcut
his partner’s promise if and only if (1) the agent’s level of reneging aversion is sufficiently high,
and (2) the partner’s level of reneging aversion is sufficiently low. This implies that both agents
are induced to overcut each other (which implies that both promise the maximal effort) if and only
if both players’ levels of reneging aversion are neither too low nor too high.
2. There are two disjoint areas in which the partnership game admits the no-effort equilibrium: (I)
an area in which both players have sufficiently high levels of reneging aversion, and (II) an area in
which both players have sufficiently low levels of reneging aversion. The intuition is the same as
for Proposition 1, discussed above.
3. The remaining region is divided into two disjoint areas in which (I) one player has a sufficiently
high level of reneging aversion and he promises the maximal level of effort, and (II) his partner
has a sufficiently low level of reneging aversion and promises a positive nonmaximal level of effort
(two-message equilibrium). The intuition is that only the player with the high level of reneging
aversion has substantial commitment power, while his partner’s promise has a very small impact
on either player’s choice of effort. As a result, the agent with high reneging aversion is essentially
a Stackelberg leader (he essentially chooses his effort by the committing promise he makes in the
first round), while the partner is essentially a Stackelberg follower.
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Appealing Properties of Intermediate Reneging Aversion
Let λ+c be the maximal level of reneging aversion for which the perfect equilibrium of the game between
two players with this level of reneging aversion is a maximum-message equilibrium. Our next result
(Theorem 2) shows that the equilibrium induced by both players having this “intermediate” level of
reneging aversion λ+c has three appealing properties:
1. “Second-best” outcome: This equilibrium induces the best equilibrium outcome among all equilib-
rium outcomes of symmetric partnership games.
2. “First-best” outcome in the limit of small effort costs: When the cost of exerting effort converges
to zero, the equilibrium payoff converges to the maximal feasible payoff induced by both agents
exerting maximal efforts.
3. Better outcome than Stackelberg equilibrium outcome: The equilibrium payoff is larger than the
mean payoff induced in a “Stackelberg” equilibrium without reneging costs (i.e., the equilibrium
when effort levels are chosen sequentially), if the cost of effort is not too high.
Evolutionary Stability of Intermediate Reneging Aversion
We study the endogenous determination of players’ levels of reneging aversion in an evolutionary frame-
work. We consider an infinite population of players in which each player is endowed with a level of
reneging aversion. Players are uniformly randomly matched into pairs, and both observe their partner’s
level of reneging aversion before starting the two-stage partnership game described above. We assume
that in each such partnership game, the players play the unique perfect equilibrium of the game.
Our final main result shows that the homogeneous population state in which all agents have the
same intermediate level of reneging aversion λ+c is evolutionarily stable. Moreover, there does not exist
any other homogeneous stable state. This demonstrates the strong tendency of evolutionary processes
to select for agents who incur intermediate psychological reneging costs.
Variants and Extensions
We demonstrate the robustness of our results by showing that our main results hold also when some of
the key assumptions of our model are relaxed. Specifically, we show that the appealing properties of the
equilibrium induced by λ+c , and the evolutionary stability of the homogeneous population state in which
agents have a reneging aversion of λ+c , hold in the following three variants/extensions of our baseline
model:
1. Sequential communication: A variant of the model in which agents make promises sequentially,
rather than simultaneously. That is, nature chooses one of the players at random, and this player
sends his promise first.
2. One-sided reneging costs: A variant of the model in which an agent suffers a reneging cost only
when his promise is higher than the level of effort he exerts in the second stage. Unlike the baseline
model, an agent does not suffer a cost when his promise is lower than his exerted effort.
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3. Partial observability: We show that our results hold also in a setup in which the partner’s reneging
cost is observed with a sufficiently high probability (which is strictly less than one). Moreover, we
show that a weaker version of this result holds also when players can observe their partner’s level
of reneging aversion with a low, yet positive, probability. In this latter case, we show that in any
stable state players must have positive reneging aversion and exert positive effort in equilibrium.
In addition, we show that our qualitative results hold in a variant of the model in which an agent incurs
a fixed reneging cost whenever the exerted effort is different from that promised, regardless of the size
of the difference.
Structure
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and the contributions made
by this paper. Section 3 studies general partnership games. Section 4 analyses partnership games with
quadratic payoffs. Section 5 shows the appealing properties and evolutionary stability of intermediate
reneging aversion λ+c . Section 6 shows the robustness of our main results to the relaxation of various
assumptions in our model. We conclude in Section 7. The formal definition of a trembling-hand perfect
equilibrium with a continuum of strategies is relegated to Appendix A. We discuss a few technical aspects
of our evolutionary interpretation in Appendix B. Additional illustrative figures are presented in online
Appendix C. Formal proofs appear in online Appendix D.
2 Related Literature and Contribution
Our paper contributes to several strands of literature, which we discuss in this section. The theoretical
literature on signaling intentions through cheap talk explores the potential for preplay communication
to select among multiple equilibria by breaking symmetries, offering assurance, and creating a focal
point for play (for a theoretical discussion, see Farrell, 1988; Farrell & Rabin, 1996; for experimental
evidence see Crawford, 1998; Charness, 2000). However, extensive experimental evidence shows that
communication can also lead players to coordinate on mutually beneficial but nonequilibrium outcomes
(Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994; Sally, 1995; Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2004; Bicchieri & Lev-On, 2011).
In particular, players often make and keep promises to cooperate in two-player partnership games where
the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium involves no such cooperation (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006;
Vanberg, 2008; Ederer & Stremitzer, 2017; Di Bartolomeo et al. , 2018). We advance the theoretical
analysis of preplay communication by presenting a novel mechanism (intermediate reneging costs) by
which communication is able to sustain such cooperative but apparently nonequilibrium action, and
demonstrate its evolutionary stability.
Our analysis of direct psychological costs of going back on one’s word is related to the theoretical
literature incorporating exogenously given (and, typically, small) psychological lying costs into strate-
gic models. Kartik et al. (2007) and Kartik (2009) study sender-receiver games in which the informed
agent has an incentive to distort the receiver’s belief, and incurs a convex cost of sending a false message.
Matsushima (2008) and Kartik et al. (2014) introduce arbitrarily small lying costs into settings of mech-
anism design and implementation. The present paper moves beyond the existing literature by analysing
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bilateral communication about agents’ own future actions rather than unilateral communication about
an exogenously given state of the world. Additionally, we endogenise the reneging costs, and allow them
to be determined as part of a stable population state.1
We contribute to the literature on partnerships with strategic complementarities by introducing
reneging costs into a general class of partnership games. Games in which n players experience a com-
mon outcome, which is increasing in a privately costly action, are examined from a mechanism design
perspective in Holmstrom (1982). Radner et al. (1986) analyse a two-player partnership game in which
a project succeeds with a probability equal to the minimum of the players’ effort choices, which are
made at quadratic cost, and show the capacity of repeated interaction to sustain effort when such an
outcome is efficient but is not an equilibrium of the one-shot game (see also related models of partnership
games in Cooper & John, 1988; ?; Cahuc & Kempf, 1997; Marx & Matthews, 2000). We demonstrate
that reneging costs is a new means by which cooperation can be sustained in partnerships in one-off
encounters with nonenforceable effort choices.
The theoretical model that we present is able to rationalise and ground the main stylised facts of the
related experimental literature. Intrinsic costs of lying or reneging on one’s promise have been examined
in a number of laboratory setups including: (1) trust games (Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2004; Charness &
Dufwenberg, 2006; Vanberg, 2008; Ederer & Stremitzer, 2017; Di Bartolomeo et al. , 2018), (2) sender-
receiver games (Gneezy, 2005; Sánchez-Pagés & Vorsatz, 2007; Hurkens & Kartik, 2009; Lundquist et al.
, 2009), and (3) reporting the outcome of a private dice roll (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Shalvi
et al. , 2011; Gneezy et al. , 2018; Abeler et al. , Forthcoming). Experimental evidence suggests that
subjects do not always lie to gain money, even when their doing so cannot be detected.2 In promising
experiments, subjects only sometimes renege on promises to carry out actions that are socially beneficial
but reduce their own payoff and, on average, achieve more efficient outcomes than when promises cannot
be made (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006; Vanberg, 2008; Ederer & Stremitzer, 2017; Di Bartolomeo et al.
, 2018).
We defer further discussion of the relation between our model and the experimental evidence to
Section 7. We note here that the main stylised facts from these experiments suggest that the intrinsic
costs of lying/reneging are intermediate, and are increasing (potentially convexly) with one or more of
the following factors: (I) the difference between the reported/exerted outcome and the true/promised
outcome, (II) the damage induced to the partner by an agent lying/reneging, and (III) others’ perceptions
of the agent’s behaviour. In our model the intrinsic cost of reneging is proportional to the difference
between the promised effort and the exerted effort, which directly captures factor (I). In a richer model,
in which others observe the exerted effort with some random noise, this difference can also capture factor
(III). In Section 6.2, we study a variant of our model in which an intrinsic cost of reneging is incurred
only if the promised effort is smaller than the exerted effort. This captures factor (II), as in this variant
1Demichelis & Weibull (2008) study the influence of the introduction of lexicographic reneging costs into a setup in which
players communicate before playing a coordination game. They show that the introduction of these lying costs implies that
the unique evolutionarily stable outcome is Pareto efficient. Heller (2014) shows that this sharp equilibrium selection result
is implied by the discontinuity of preferences, rather than by small lying costs per se.
2In the case of reporting a private dice roll, Abeler et al. ’s Finding 1 demonstrates that subjects obtain only about a
quarter of the payoff they could obtain by reporting the die’s maximal outcome. When subjects lie, they sometimes do so
by using a nonmaximal lie (see, e.g., Abeler et al. , Finding 5), suggesting that bigger lies induce higher intrinsic costs.
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the partner suffers a utility loss proportional to the extent to which promised effort was higher than
exerted effort. Our model therefore captures the central findings of these studies, but also allows the level
of reneging aversion to be endogenously determined by an evolutionary process, providing a theoretical
foundation and explanation for these stylised experimental facts.
In our theoretical exploration of the potential evolutionary determinants of reneging aversion, we
build on the “indirect” evolutionary approach, pioneered by Güth & Yaari (1992), and developed by,
among others,Ok & Vega-Redondo (2001), Guttman (2003), Dekel et al. (2007), Herold & Kuzmics
(2009), Alger & Weibull (2010), and Alger & Weibull (2012). We make two main contributions to
this literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply the indirect evolutionary
approach to study reneging costs. Second, our main result is qualitatively different from the stylised
result in the existing literature, according to which if preferences are observed with high probability,
then the Pareto-efficient outcome is played in any stable population state. We show that in the setup in
which the set of feasible preferences is the set of levels of reneging aversion, evolutionary forces take the
population into stable states in which agents have intermediate reneging aversion and the agents achieve
partial, rather than full, efficiency.
Heifetz et al. (2007b) study payoff-monotonic selection dynamics in normal-form games in which the
set of strategies of each player is an open subset of Rn and preference “distortions” (divergences between
the subjective utility function and the material payoff function) are perfectly observable. They show that
in almost every such game and for almost every family of distortions of a player’s actual payoffs, some
degree of distortion is beneficial to the player, and will not be driven out by any evolutionary process
in the sense that there will not be a convergence to a population in which everyone has zero distortion.
Heifetz et al. (2007a) make additional assumptions: (1) the set of actions of each player is an interval in
R, (2) the underlying game has a unique pure equilibrium for each pair of distortions, and (3) the type
game is dominance solvable. Under these assumptions the authors show that the selection dynamics
converge to every player having the same distorted type, and that this result can be extended to a setup
with partial observability. The game studied in this paper does not satisfy these additional assumptions
(in particular, the set of strategies of the normal-form game is infinite-dimensional). Nevertheless, we
are able to show results that are consistent with the results of Heifetz et al. (2007a) and, in addition,
to explicitly characterise the unique stable level of reneging aversion.
Finally, the role of commitment in strategic situations has been extensively investigated since the
seminal work of Schelling (1980) (see, e.g., Caruana & Einav, 2008; Ellingsen & Miettinen, 2008; Heller
& Winter, 2016 for recent papers in this vast literature). One of the main stylised insights of this
literature is that the ability to commit is advantageous to a player and that, typically, a better ability
to commit yields higher payoffs. Our model yields the insight that too great a capacity for commitment
(i.e., too high a level of reneging aversion) might be detrimental. Specifically, we show that there is an
intermediate level of commitment that is optimal for an agent, as it balances his interest in making a
strong commitment in order to induce high effort from his partner, against his conflicting desire to retain
some flexibility to exert less effort.
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3 The Partnership Game
In this section, we formally describe a broad class of partnership games with reneging costs, and show
that if both agents have either too low or too high reneging costs, essentially no efforts are exerted in
the game. By contrast, in the next section we will show how intermediate reneging costs induce the
second-best outcome.
3.1 Stages and Strategies
There are two players (i and j) and two stages (or rounds) of the game. In the first stage, both players
simultaneously send a message sk ∈ [a, b] to their partner (where k = i, j, and a < b). The interpretation
is that players’ messages take the form of a promise about effort in the second stage. In the second
stage, players simultaneously choose their level of effort, xk ∈ [a, b] (after observing the promises made
in the first stage).
A (pure) strategy of an agent is a pair (s∗i , x∗i ), where s∗i ∈ [a, b] is the agent’s promise in the first
round, and x∗i : [0, 1]
2 → [0, 1] is a function describing the agent’s effort as a function of the pair of
promises sent in the first round by the agent and his partner.
3.2 The Material Payoffs
The “material” payoffs of the agents depend only on the levels of effort they exert in the second round.
Let pi(xi, xj) be the material payoff of an agent exerting effort xi ∈ [a, b], given that his partner exerted
effort xj ∈ [a, b]. We make three assumptions about the function pi:
1. Lipschitz continuity: We assume that pi(xi, xj) is Lipschitz continuous in both variables, i.e., that
there exists M > 0 such that for each (xi, xj) ,
(
x′i, x′j
)
∈ [a, b]2,
∣∣∣pi (xi, xj)− pi (x′i, x′j)∣∣∣ < M · (∣∣xi − x′i∣∣+ ∣∣∣xj − x′j∣∣∣) .
2. Positive externalities: We assume that pi(xi, xj) is weakly increasing in its second argument, i.e.,
that x′j ≥ xj implies that pi(xi, x′j) ≥ pi(xi, xj). That is, an agent weakly gains from his partner
exerting more effort.
3. Encouraging shirking above some effort level c: Our last assumption regarding pi is that there exists
an effort level c ∈ [a, b], such that for each strategy of the agent xi > c, and for each strategy of
the partner xj ≤ xi, the agent strictly gains by exerting less effort than xi, and, moreover, this
increase in payoff can be bounded away from zero. Formally:
Definition 1. Let pi : [a, b]2 −→ R be a payoff function and let c ∈ [a, b]. We say that the function
pi encourages shirking above c if for each x > c, there exists  > 0 such that for each xi ≥ x and
for each xj ≤ xi, there exists x′i ≤ xi such that pi (x′i, xj) > pi (xi, xj) + .
The following lemma shows that when the payoff function is differentiable, then the property of encour-
aging shirking above c is implied by having the maximal best reply of each strategy xj smaller than
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max (c, xj). Formally, define
max (BRpi (xj)) ≡ argmaxxi∈[a,b] (pi(xi, xj))
as the maximal value of xi that maximises the material payoff of player i when player j plays xj . Then
(the simple technical proof is presented in Appendix D.1):
Lemma 1. Assume that pi(xi, xj) is continuously twice differentiable and that (1) max (BRpi (xj)) < xj
for each xj > c, and (2) max (BRpi (xj)) ≤ c for each xj ≤ c. Then pi(xi, xj) encourages shirking above
c.
Recall that a game with a continuously twice differentiable payoff function pi (xi, xj) has strategic
complements if ∂
2pii(xi,xj)
∂xi·∂xj > 0 for each xi, xj . Given a game with strategic complements, let x¯ be the
highest rationalizable strategy. Recall (see, e.g., Milgrom & Roberts, 1990; Levin, 2003) that (x¯, x¯) is a
Nash equilibrium of the game. The following lemma shows that any game with strategic complements
encourages shirking above x¯. Formally:
Lemma 2. Let pi : [a, b]2 −→ R be a continuously twice differentiable payoff function that satisfies
strategic complements. Let x¯ be the highest rationalizable strategy. Then pi encourages shirking above x¯.
Proof. Let xj ∈ [a, b]. We have to show that (1) max (BRpi (xj)) < xj if xj > x¯, and (2) max (BRpi (xj)) ≤
x¯ if xj ≤ x¯. Assume first that xj ∈ [a, x¯]. The fact that x¯ ∈ BRpi (x¯) and the strategic complemen-
tarity imply that max (BRpi (xj)) ≤ x¯. We are left with the case xj > x¯. Assume to the contrary that
max (BRpi (xj)) ≥ xj . Consider the restricted game in which each agent is restricted to choose a strategy
in [xj , b]. This restricted game admits a symmetric Nash equilibrium (x′, x′). The strategic complemen-
tarity and max (BRpi (xj)) ≥ xj imply that (x′, x′) is also a Nash equilibrium of the unrestricted game,
and we get a contradiction to x¯ being the highest rationalizable strategy.
Thus, the three mild assumptions presented above are, essentially, satisfied in any game with strategic
complements (and positive externalities), such as price competition with differentiated goods, which is
presented in Example 1.
Example 1 (Price competition with differentiated goods; see a textbook analysis in Mas-Colell et al. ,
1995, Section 12.C ). Consider a mass one of consumers equally distributed in the interval [0, 1]. Consider
two firms that produce widgets, located at the two extreme locations: 0 and 1. Every consumer wants
at most one widget. Producing a widget has a constant marginal cost, which we normalise to zero. Each
firm i chooses a price xi ∈ [0,M ] for its widgets. The total cost of buying a widget from firm i is equal
to its price, xi, plus t times the consumer’s distance from the firm, where t ∈ [0,M ]. Each consumer
buys a widget from the firm with the lower total buying cost. This implies that the total demand for
good i is given by function qi (xi, xj):
qi (xi, xj) =

0 xi > xj + t
xj−xi+t
2·t xi ∈ [xj − t, xj + t]
1 xi < xj − t,
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The payoff (profit) of firm i is given by pii (xi, xj) = xi · qi (xi, xj). Observe that the payoff function
is Lipschitz continuous in both variables, and that the payoff of each agent is weakly increasing in the
opponent firm’s price (as a larger opponent firm’s price increases the demand for the firm’s widgets,
which in turn, weakly increases the firm’s profit). One can show that the best reply function of each
player is
BR (xj) =

xj+t
2 xj < 3 · t
xj − t xj ≥ 3 · t.
Thus we have that BR (xj) < max (xj , t), which implies that the payoff function encourages shirking
above t (which, one can show, is the unique rationalizable strategy).
3.3 The Reneging Costs
We assume that each player i is endowed with a level of reneging aversion λi. The players’ levels
of reneging aversion are common knowledge. The subjective utility of each player i is the sum of
the material payoff and a term representing the psychological cost of breaking a promise (reneging).
Formally:
Ui(xi, xj , si, λi) = pi(xi, xj)− λi ·D (|si − xi|) .
Hence, reneging is defined as exerting a level of effort not equal to the message sent (i.e., the effort
promised) in the first stage. The “size” of player i’s reneging is defined as |si − xi|. The function
D : [0, b− a]→ R+ determines the shape of the reneging cost function. We assume that this function is
weakly increasing (i.e., x ≥ y implies D (x) ≥ D (y)), and that D (x) > D (0) for each x > 0. That is,
any difference between the promise and the exerted effort induces a positive intrinsic cost. To simplify
notation, we normalise D such that D (0) = 0.
3.4 Nonintermediate Costs Induce Zero Effort
Our first result shows that agents do not exert effort above c in any pure subgame-perfect equilibrium
of the partnership game whenever the reneging costs are either too low or too high. The intuition is as
follows:
1. Too low reneging costs induce too little commitment power. As a result, no promise to exert effort
greater than c is sufficiently “credible” to induce effort from the agent’s partner and each agent will
undercut any level of their partner’s effort above c in the second round, regardless of the promises
made. As a result, both agents exert effort of at most c.
2. Too high reneging costs leave too little flexibility for the second round, making agents unwilling to
promise effort. Specifically, each agent in the second round exerts a level of effort very close to his
own promise, regardless of his partner’s promise. This, in turn, implies that each agent undercuts
his partner’s promise in the first round, which implies that both agents promise effort of at most
c in the first round and exert effort of at most c in the second round.
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Proposition 1. Assume that the payoff function pi : [a, b]2 −→ R is Lipschitz continuous, weakly increas-
ing in the partner’s effort, and encourages shirking above c. Then, for any  > 0, there exist λ > λ > 0,
such that the effort level exerted by any agent in any pure subgame-perfect equilibrium of the partnership
game is at most c+  if either (1) λi, λj < λ or (2) λi, λj > λ.
Remark 1. The result that too high reneging costs induce efforts of at most c depends on the combination
of the following two assumptions: (1) simultaneous communication and (2) “two-sided” reneging costs,
in the sense that an agent incurs a reneging cost also when exerting more effort than promised.
In Section 6 we demonstrate (partial) robustness of this result to the relaxation of these assumptions.
Specifically, we study games with (1) sequential communication and (2) “one-sided” reneging costs (while
focusing on quadratic payoffs), and we demonstrate that when both agents have high reneging costs they
may exert efforts above c in equilibrium, but these efforts are smaller than those induced by intermediate
reneging costs.
4 Partnership Game with Quadratic Payoffs
4.1 Quadratic Payoffs
For tractability, we focus in the remaining analysis on a specific family of quadratic payoff functions.
We define the material payoff of a player who exerts effort xi and whose partner exerts effort xj as the
following function (which is homogeneous of degree 2):
pi(xi, xj , c) = xi · xj − c · x
2
i
2 : c ∈ (1, 2) . (1)
The interpretation of the quadratic material payoff is as follows. Both players receive the same gross
return from the partnership, equal to the product of their two effort choices. They each incur a cost
proportional to the square of their own effort. The parameter c ∈ (1, 2) governs the cost of effort.3
The subjective utility of each player i is defined as follows:
Ui(xi, xj , si, c) = xi · xj − c · x
2
i
2 −
λi
2 (si − xi)
2. (2)
The utility loss from reneging on a promise is proportional to the square of the difference between
the promised effort and the exerted effort, multiplied by the agent’s level of reneging aversion λi ≥ 0.
We extend the material payoffs and the subjective utility to mixed strategies in the usual linear way
(i.e., players are expected utility maximisers). It turns out that, essentially, all perfect equilibria are
pure; thus, we focus in the main text on pure strategies. (We formally deal with mixed strategies in
Lemma 3 and Footnote 15.)
3We restrict attention to c ∈ (1, 2) as this is the interval in which (1) players exerting maximal effort is efficient and (2),
as shown below, the game with simultaneous effort choices encourages shirking above an effort of zero. Note that when
c > 2, the efficient outcome is for both players to exert zero effort. When c < 1, the unique Nash equilibrium in the game
with simultaneous effort choices is xi = xj = 1.
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4.2 Unique Second-Stage Equilibrium
In the second stage of the game, player i’s first-order condition for his choice of xi is given by4
xj − cxi + λi(si − xi) = 0. (3)
The strict concavity of the utility function in xi implies that the second-stage best reply is a unique
pure strategy, which implies that we can focus in the second stage, without loss of generality, on pure
strategies. The unique best-reply strategy is given by the function
x∗i (xj , si, sj , λi, λj , c) =
xj + λisi
c+ λi
. (4)
This equation embodies a player’s (possibly conflicting) desires to undercut (exert less effort than) his
partner and to minimise his reneging.
Fact 1. We first observe that when λi = λj = 0 (i.e., both players’ messages are cheap talk), the best
reply of player i reduces to xjc . This implies that when talk is cheap, both players wish to undercut their
partner in the second stage, effort choices are independent of messages sent, and in all subgame-perfect
equilibria, neither player exerts effort and communication plays no committing role.
To consider the general case of positive reneging costs, we solve the best-reply functions simulta-
neously and obtain the unique Nash equilibrium strategy for player i in the subgame induced by an
arbitrary pair of messages si and sj :
xei (si, sj , λi, λj , c) =
(c+ λj)λisi + λjsj
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1 . (5)
To gain some intuition, we can consider the subgame after si = sj = s is played. In this case, xi <
xj ⇐⇒ λi < λj . Both players have an incentive to undercut one another (and by implication renege
on their own first-stage promises), but at the same time they do not want to incur too great a cost from
reneging. Due to the convex cost of reneging and the diminishing material gains from reducing effort
toward xjc , the optimal choice of xi balances these two aims. In the general case where si 6= sj , the Nash
equilibrium choice of xi is some convex combination of5 si, sj , and 0. As a player’s level of reneging
aversion increases, he will exert effort closer to his own promise.
4.3 First-Stage Best-Reply Functions
The subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game is easily obtained using backward induction. Given the
unique Nash equilibrium strategies in each subgame, we can derive the player’s utility Ui(si, sj , c) as a
function of the messages sent by the agent and his partner (assuming that both players follow the unique
4The second derivative of the utility function with respect to xi is −c−λi. The fact that it is always negative guarantees
that the solution to the first-order condition is a global maximum of the utility function and that the optimal choice in the
second stage is a unique pure strategy.
5To see this, observe that the denominator of the fraction is strictly positive and strictly greater than the sum of the
coefficients on si and s−i in the numerator.
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Nash equilibrium in the second stage of the game).
Ui(si, sj , c) ≡ Ui
(
xei (si, sj , λi, λj , c), xej(si, sj , λi, λj , c), si, c
)
. (6)
Clearly, if λi = 0, then a player’s choice of message has no impact upon his own or his partner’s choices
and any message is a best reply. When λi > 0, it turns out that the derived utility function Ui(si, sj , c)
leads to a unique pure best reply in all but a measure zero of cases,6 which implies that, without loss of
generality, we can focus on pure strategies (formal details for this argument are presented in the proof
of Prop. 2 in Appendix D.4).
Our next result characterises the first-stage best-reply functions. Let s∗i (sj |λi, λj , c) denote the best
reply of agent i (with reneging cost λi) to a partner’s message of sj , where the cost of effort is c.
First, we show that if c ≥ √2, then each agent always wants to undercut his partner’s message, i.e.,
s∗i (sj |λi, λj , c) < sj for each sj > 0. The intuition is that such a high value of c provides too large
incentives to undercut the partner. By contrast, if c <
√
2, then there exists λ¯c > 0, such that:
1. If λj > λ¯c, then the agent’s best reply is to undercut his partner’s message. The intuition is that
if λj is sufficiently high, the partner is going to exert a level of effort close to sj regardless of the
level of si, and this implies that agent i is better off if he undercuts his partner’s message, as the
direct benefit to the agent of being able to undercut his partner in the second stage outweighs the
small indirect cost of inducing his partner to exert a little bit less effort in the second stage.
2. If λj < λ¯c, then the agent’s best reply is to overcut his partner (i.e., s∗i (sj |λi, λj , c) > sj for each
sj < 1), provided that λi is sufficiently large (and to undercut his partner otherwise). The intuition
is that when the partner’s reneging cost is not too large, the indirect benefit of overcutting the
partner’s message (which induces the partner to exert more effort in the second stage) is increasing
in the agent’s reneging cost (as his promise is more credible), and for a sufficiently large λi, this
benefit outweighs the direct cost of restricting the agent’s ability to shirk in the second stage.
Proposition 2.
1. If c ≥ √2, then s∗i (sj |λi, λj , c) < sj for each sj > 0, λi > 0, and λj ≥ 0 (undercutting).
2. Otherwise, for each c <
√
2, let λ¯c ≡ 2−c2c−1 > 0.
(a) If λj ≥ λ¯c, then s∗i (sj |λi, λj , c) < sj for each sj > 0 and λi > 0 (undercutting).
(b) If λj < λ¯c, then, there exist x (λj , c) > 0, such that:
i. s∗i (sj |λi, λj , c) < sj for each 0 < λi < x (λj , c) and sj > 0 (undercutting).
ii. s∗i (sj |λi, λj , c) > sj for each λi > x (λj , c) and 0 < sj < 1 (overcutting).
The division of the parameter space into these best-reply types (undercutting vs. overcutting) is illus-
trated in Figure 1 for the effort costs of c = 1.1 and c = 1.2 (additional effort costs are illustrated in
Appendix C).
6The choice of best reply in these measure-zero cases plays no role in our analysis.
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(a) c = 1.1 (b) c = 1.2
Figure 1: Best-Resply Types for Player i in a Reneging Aversion Parameter Space. The
x axis in each figure presents the player’s level of reneging aversion (λi) and the y axis presents the
partner’s level of reneging aversion (λj). The left panel deals with a cost of effort of c = 1.1 and the
right figure deals with c = 1.2. The dark area in each panel is the region in which player i’s best reply
is to undercut his partner, i.e., s∗i (sj) < sj ; the light area in each panel is the region in which player
i’s best reply is to overcut his partner, i.e., s∗i (sj) > sj . The dashed line in each figure shows the
value λj = λ¯c ≡ 2−c2c−1 > 0 presented in Proposition 2, above which player i’s best reply is to undercut
his partner regardless of the value of λi.
4.4 Unique Perfect Equilibrium
We now characterise the subgame-perfect equilibria of the partnership game. Recall that a strategy
profile
((
s∗i , s∗j
)
,
(
x∗i (−→s ) , x∗j (−→s )
))
is a subgame-perfect equilibrium if for each player i (1) x∗i (−→s ) =
xei (si, sj , λi, λj , c) (i.e., best replying in the second stage), and (2) Ui(s∗i , s∗j , c) ≥ Ui(s′i, s∗j , c) for each
message s′i ∈ [0, 1] (i.e., best replying in the first stage), where the derived utility Ui(s∗i , s∗j , c) is as
defined in (6).
We show that all subgame-perfect equilibria can be classified into three types:
1. Maximum message equilibrium, in which agents send maximal promises, i.e., s∗i = s∗j = 1.
2. No-effort equilibrium, in which agents exert no effort, i.e., x∗i
(−→
s∗
)
= x∗j
(−→
s∗
)
= 0. In this equilib-
rium any agent with a positive reneging cost promises nothing, i.e., λi > 0⇒ s∗i = 0.
3. Two-message equilibrium. In this equilibrium one of the agents sends the maximal message, while
his partner undercuts the agent’s message, i.e., either si = 1 > sj or sj = 1 > si.
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In some parameterisations of the game, the subgame-perfect equilibrium is unique. In all the remaining
cases (except the “measure zero” set of pairs with multiple equilibria discussed below), the game admits
two subgame-perfect equilibria, where only one of these equilibria satisfies trembling-hand perfection
(see the formal definition, a` la Selten, 1975; Simon & Stinchcombe, 1995, in Appendix A). The imperfect
equilibrium is characterised by each agent sending a zero message. However, any small perturbation
(e.g., with a small probability, , each player trembles and chooses his promise uniformly) induces at
least one of the agents to overcut his partner, leading to this equilibrium being eliminated from the
perturbed game.
Theorem 1 (below) shows that:
1. If c ≥ √2, then the partnership game admits only a no-effort equilibrium.
2. If c ∈
(
1.25,
√
2
)
, then:
(a) There is a connected symmetric region in which the partnership games admit the no-effort
equilibrium. This region includes all games in which (1) both agents have the same levels
of reneging aversion (i.e., λi = λj), (2) both agents have sufficiently high levels of reneging
aversion, and (3) both agents have sufficiently low levels of reneging aversion.
(b) The remaining region is divided into two disjoint areas in which one agent has a sufficiently
low level of reneging aversion and his partner has a sufficiently high level of reneging aversion,
and the game admits the two-message equilibrium.
3. If c ∈ (1, 1.25), then:
(a) There is a convex symmetric region of intermediate levels of reneging aversion in which the
game admits a maximum message equilibrium.
(b) There are two disjoint areas in which the partnership game admits the no-effort equilibrium:
(1) an area in which both agents have sufficiently high levels of reneging aversion and (2) an
area in which both agents have sufficiently low levels of reneging aversion.
(c) The remaining region is divided into two disjoint areas in which one agent has a sufficiently
low level of reneging aversion and his partner has a sufficiently high level of reneging aversion,
and the game admits the two-message equilibrium.
Figure 2 illustrates the division of the reneging aversion parameter space into the three classes of unique
equilibria for the effort costs of c = 1.1 and c = 1.2 (additional effort costs, namely, 1.05, 1.15, 1.25, and
1.35) are illustrated in Appendix C.
Formally (the definition of trembling-hand perfection is presented in Appendix A):
Theorem 1. For each c > 1, there exist pairwise disjoint symmetric sets Λc0−eff ,Λcmax, Λc2−msg ⊆
[0,∞)2 that satisfy the following properties:
1. The union of the closures is exhaustive:7 (i.e., Cl
(
Λc0−eff
)
∪Cl (Λcmax)∪Cl
(
Λc2−msg
)
= [0,∞)2).
7Cl (Λ) is the closure of the set Λ, i.e., the set Λ together with all its limit points.
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(a) c = 1.1 (b) c = 1.2
Figure 2: Unique Perfect Equilibrium Types in a Reneging Aversion Parameter Space.
The x axis in each figure presents the player’s level of reneging aversion (λi) and the y axis presents
the partner’s level of reneging aversion (λj). The left panel deals with a cost of effort of c = 1.1 and
the right panel deals with c = 1.2. The dark areas in each figure are the regions in which both agents
exert no effort in equilibrium (“No Effort”). The light area in each figure is the region in which
both agents promise maximal efforts in the unique perfect equilibrium (“Maximum Message”). The
remaining areas are the regions in which one of the agents sends a maximal promise (“2 Message”).
2. Let
((
s∗i , s∗j
)
,
(
x∗i (−→s ) , x∗j (−→s )
))
be a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium of the partnership game
with effort cost c and reneging costs of λi and λj.
(a) No-effort equilibrium: If (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0−eff then x∗i (−→s ∗) = x∗j (−→s ∗) = 0 and, for each agent
k ∈ {i, j}, λk > 0 implies that s∗k = 0.
(b) Two-message equilibrium: If (λi, λj) ∈ Λc2−msg and λi > λj then (I) s∗i = 1, and (II) λj > 0
implies that s∗j < 1.
(c) Maximum message equilibrium: If (λi, λj) ∈ Λcmax then s∗i = s∗j = 1.
3. If c ≥ √2 then Λc0−eff = [0,∞)2 (i.e., only the no-effort equilibrium exists).
4. If c ∈
(
1,
√
2
)
and λj < 2c − c, then there is xcλi, such that (λi, λj) ∈ Λc2−msg ∀λi > xcλi.
5. If c ∈
(
1.25,
√
2
)
, then: (I) Λcmax = ∅, (II) (λ, λ) ∈ Λc0−eff for each λ ≥ 0, and (III) there exist
0 < λc < λc, such that either λi, λj ≤ λc or λi, λj ≥ λc implies that (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0−eff .
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6. If c ∈ (1, 1.25), then there exist 0 < λ−c < λ+c , s.t. (I) Λcmax is convex, (II) λ ∈
(
λ−c , λ+c
)
implies
that (λ, λ) ∈ Λcmax, (III) (λ, λ′) ∈ Λcmax implies that λ−c ≤ max (λ, λ′) < λ+c , (IV) there exist
λc ≤ λ−c and λc ≥ λ+c , such that if either λi, λj < λc or λi, λj > λc, then (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0−eff .
Sketch of proof for the case of c ∈ (1, 1.25). When both λi and λj are low or when both are high, the
unique equilibrium is a no-effort equilibrium. The intuition is similar to the one presented before Propo-
sition 1: (1) too low reneging costs induce too little commitment power and, as a result, each agent
undercuts his partner’s effort in the second round regardless of the promises and (2) too high reneging
costs leave too little flexibility for the second round, which induces each agent to undercut his partner’s
promise in the first round.
When one player has a high level of reneging aversion and the other a low level, the unique equilibrium
is a two-message equilibrium. The intuition is that only the agent with the high reneging cost has a
substantial commitment power, while their partner’s promise has very small impact on either player’s
effort choice. As a result, the agent with the high reneging cost is essentially a Stackelberg leader (he
essentially chooses his effort by the committing promise he makes in the first round), while the partner
is essentially a Stackelberg follower (her promise in the first round has little influence on her choice of
effort in the second round). The lower the cost of effort is, the higher the effort that the Stackelberg
follower will exert in reply to a given promise by the leader. When the effort cost is low enough, it
therefore becomes worthwhile for the leader to make the promise of high effort.
Finally, if both players’ levels of reneging aversion are intermediate (and sufficiently similar) then
we have the maximum message equilibrium. The intuition is similar to that presented in case (2) of
Proposition 2. If the partner’s level of reneging aversion is not too high, the indirect benefit of overcutting
the partner’s message (which induces the partner to exert more effort in the second stage) is increasing
in the agent’s level of reneging aversion (as his promise is more credible). If the agent’s level of reneging
aversion is sufficiently high, this benefit outweighs the direct cost of restricting his ability to shirk in the
second stage. Therefore, if both players have a level of reneging aversion that is high enough to give
them committing power but is not so high that they do not have some flexibility in the second stage,
they will wish to overcut each other. This happens in a convex region of intermediate levels of reneging
aversion. In this region, both players are sufficiently bound by their message to be able to strategically
induce high effort in their partner, but are also flexible enough to respond to their partner’s promise.
5 Appealing Properties of Intermediate Reneging Aversion, λ+c
5.1 Induced Population Game
Theorem 1 has shown that almost all partnership games have a unique trembling-hand perfect equilib-
rium. Multiple perfect equilibria may occur only on a “measure-zero” of pairs of λi, λj that are located
on the boundaries between the open sets Λc0−eff , Λcmax, and Λc2−msg. In this “measure-one” set of pairs
of levels of reneging aversion, we define pic (λi, λj) to be the unique (trembling-hand) perfect equilibrium
payoff of an agent with reneging aversion λi who is matched with a partner with reneging aversion λj .
Recall, that, for each c ∈ (1, 1.25), one of the pairs in these measure-zero boundaries is (λ+c , λ+c ),
which is the upper limit of all pairs in the set Λcmax of intermediate levels of reneging aversion that
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induce maximal messages. In Corollary 2 of Theorem 1, we show that the pair of levels of reneging
aversion
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
induces a continuum of perfect equilibria. Specifically, for each message s∗ ∈ [0, 1],
there is a perfect equilibrium in which both agents send message s∗. We define pic
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
as the highest
equilibrium payoff among these equilibria (i.e., the payoff induced in the equilibrium in which the agents
send the maximal message, s∗ = 1). We discuss this equilibrium selection in Remark 2 below. Given any
other pair (λi, λj) with multiple equilibria, we can apply any arbitrary equilibrium selection function
(without affecting our results), and we let pi (λ, λ′) be the material payoff induced by the arbitrarily
selected equilibrium.
The payoff function pic : R+ × R+ → R+ defined above induces a symmetric two-player population
game Γ =
(
R+, pi
)
. This population game can be interpreted as being played between two principals,
where each principal simultaneously chooses a reneging cost for his agent, the two agents are matched
to play the partnership game (where each agent observes his partner’s reneging cost), and they play
the perfect equilibrium of the partnership game (applying the equilibrium selection function mentioned
above when multiple perfect equilibria exist). In Section 5.3 we discuss an evolutionary interpretation
of the population game and of our results.
A pure (mixed) strategy in this game corresponds to a level of reneging aversion (a distribution over
levels of reneging aversion). We say that (λ, λ) is a symmetric (strict) pure Nash equilibrium of the
population game if pi (λ, λ) ≥ pi (λ′, λ) (pi (λ, λ) > pi (λ′, λ)) for each λ′ 6= λ.
5.2 Appealing Properties of λ+c
In the following result we focus on the case of low costs of effort, in which maximum-message equilibria
exist (i.e., we focus on the case of c < 1.25). We show that the maximum-message equilibrium induced by
the symmetric pair of intermediate levels of reneging aversion
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
has various appealing properties:
1. “Second-best” symmetric outcome: The equilibrium induced by
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
induces the best equilib-
rium outcome among all equilibrium outcomes of symmetric partnership games, i.e., pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
>
pi
(
λ
′
, λ′
)
for any λ′ 6= λ+c .
2. As c converges to 1, the equilibrium payoff converges to the maximum feasible payoff, achieved by
both agents exerting the maximum effort of one. This maximum feasible payoff is equal to 1− 1c ,
and it converges to 0.5 as c converges to one.
3. It is a strict equilibrium of the population game (i.e., (pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> pi
(
λ′, λ+c
)
).
4. The equilibrium payoff pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
is larger than the mean payoff induced in a “Stackelberg” equi-
librium without reneging costs (i.e., the equilibrium when effort levels are chosen sequentially), if
the cost of effort is low (c < 1.22).
5. The population game does not admit any other symmetric pure equilibrium.
Formally:
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Theorem 2. Fix c ∈ (1, 1.25). Let (λ+c , λ+c ) be the highest symmetric pair of levels of reneging aver-
sion inducing a maximum-message equilibrium (as defined in Theorem 1). The equilibrium induced by(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
has the following properties:
1. “Second-best” symmetric outcome: pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> pi
(
λ
′
, λ′
)
for any λ′ 6= λ+c .
2. Convergence to “first-best” outcome: limc→1 pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
= 12 (which is the best symmetric feasible
material payoff).
3. Strict equilibrium of the population game: pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> pi
(
λ′, λ+c
)
for each λ′ 6= λ+c .
4. Better outcome than the sequential-game equilibrium outcome when effort costs are low: Let pisi be
the payoff to player i in the unique equilibrium of the game where efforts are chosen sequentially
(and there are no reneging costs). Then if c < 1.22, pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> 12 ·
(
pisi + pisj
)
.
5. Unique pure symmetric equilibrium: If c < 1.24 and there is λ∗ such that pi (λ∗, λ∗) ≥ pi (λ′, λ∗) for
each λ′, then8 λ∗ = λ+c .
Sketch of proof.
1. “Second-best” symmetric outcome: Recall that λ+c is the highest level of reneging aversion that
induces a maximum-message equilibrium. Theorem 2 implies that any higher symmetric level of
reneging aversion λ > λ+c induces the no-effort equilibrium with the lowest possible payoff. One can
show that the weaker commitment power induced by lower symmetric levels of reneging aversion
λ < λ+c induces agents to exert less effort relative to the symmetric equilibrium induced by λ+c ,
and thus to achieve a lower payoff.
2. Convergence to “first-best” outcome: Recall that agents promise maximal efforts in the equilibrium
induced by
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
, and that they somewhat shirk in the second round due to the fact that the
material payoffs are maximised when exerting 1c times the partner’s effort choice. As c converges
to one, the effort level that maximises the material payoff converges to the partner’s effort choice,
the incentives to shirk are diminished, and, as a result, the equilibrium effort levels exerted by the
players converge to one.
3. Strict equilibrium of the population game: For any λ > λ+c the game induced by
(
λ, λ+c
)
admits
only the no-effort equilibrium, which yields each player a zero payoff. When λ < λ+c , the lower
commitment power of the player with reneging aversion λ implies that the players exert less ef-
fort in the unique perfect equilibrium, and that the payoff of both players is strictly worse than
the equilibrium payoff of the game induced by
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
. This implies that
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
is a strict
equilibrium of the population game.
4. Better outcome than the sequential-game equilibrium outcome: In the sequential effort setting (with
no reneging costs) the “Stackelberg leader” will choose effort level 1 and the follower will choose
8Our proof technique allows us to prove the uniqueness results only for c ∈ (1, 1.24). Numeric simulations suggest that
the result also holds for c ∈ (1.24, 1.25).
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effort level 1c . In the equilibrium outcome under λ+c , both agents promise to exert an effort of 1,
and in the second stage due to the substantial reneging costs, the agents choose an effort that is
much closer to one than to 1c , when the cost of effort is sufficiently low.9 The intuition for why the
average payoff with reneging costs converges “faster” to the first best as effort costs decrease (as
compared to sequential effort choices) is that, whereas with sequential choices lower effort costs
mean simply that the second player has a smaller incentive to shirk, and so puts in more effort
as effort costs fall (with no change in the leader’s action), with communication there is a positive
reinforcing mechanism whereby the knowledge that his partner is going to put in more effort means
that a player will choose to put in more effort himself, leading his partner to want to exert more
effort, and so on.
5. Unique pure symmetric equilibrium: We show that an agent can gain by having a higher reneging
cost than his partner for every level of the partner’s reneging cost λ < λ+c , which implies that (λ, λ)
is not a Nash equilibrium of the population game for any λ < λ+c . The intuition is that the indirect
gain induced by the stronger commitment power of the agent (which, in turn, induces the partner
to exert more effort in the unique equilibrium) outweighs the loss induced by the smaller flexibility
in the choice of effort in the second stage. Observe that Theorem 1 implies that for any λ > λ+c
the game induced by (λ, λ) admits the no-effort equilibrium, which yields each player a payoff of
zero. One can show that if an agent deviates to a sufficiently low level of reneging aversion, then
the players play a two-message equilibrium that yields the deviator a positive payoff. This implies
that (λ, λ) is not a Nash equilibrium of the population game for any λ > λ+c .
5.3 Evolutionary Interpretation of Our Results
Consider a large population of players (technically, a continuum) in which each player is endowed with
a level of reneging aversion. Players are uniformly randomly matched into pairs, and both observe their
partner’s level of reneging aversion before starting the two-stage partnership game described above. We
assume that in each such partnership game, the players play the unique perfect equilibrium (and they
follow the equilibrium selection function described above when there are multiple equilibria).
Consider first the case in which the set of feasible levels of reneging aversion are discrete (e.g., the
set of feasible λs are 0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, ...). This discreteness might be due to having a finite, albeit very
large, set of feasible genotypes in biological evolutionary processes, or due to some constraints in social
evolutionary processes (e.g., each agent follows a simple rule of thumb to guide his behaviour, and the
set of simple rules is finite). It is well known that stable population states in this setup correspond to
symmetric equilibria of the population game, given a smooth and payoff-monotone dynamic process by
which the levels of reneging aversion in the population evolve, such as the replicator dynamics (Taylor
& Jonker, 1978; see Weibull, 1995; Sandholm, 2010 for a textbook introduction). Specifically:
1. Any symmetric strict equilibrium corresponds to a stable population state in which all the in-
cumbents have the same level of reneging aversion. Any agent who is endowed with a different
9It turns out that the higher payoff in the equilibrium induced by
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
holds for any c < 1.22, but it does not hold
for c ∈ (1.22, 1.25).
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level of reneging aversion (due to random error or experimentation) is strictly outperformed and
is assumed to be eliminated from the population. The same holds for any sufficiently small group
of “mutant” agents who are endowed with a different level of reneging aversion. In particular, it
is well known that any strict equilibrium is an evolutionarily stable state a` la Maynard Smith &
Price (1973).
2. Any stable population state must be a symmetric Nash equilibrium (see, e.g., Nachbar, 1990).
Otherwise, there is a level of reneging aversion that allows a deviator to strictly outperform the
incumbents; we assume that other agents will start to mimic such a successful deviator, and that
the population will move away from the initial state.
Thus, part (3) of Theorem 2 implies that the homogeneous population state in which all agents have the
same intermediate level of reneging aversion λ+c is dynamically stable. Part (3) of Theorem 2 implies that
this state is the unique homogeneous stable state. This suggests a tendency of evolutionary processes to
select the level of reneging aversion λ+c when players each observe their partner’s type.
When the set of feasible levels of reneging aversion is a continuum (i.e., without the discretization
described above), then, as argued by Eshel (1983) and Oechssler & Riedel (2001), a strict equilibrium
might not be a sufficient condition for dynamic stability in setups in which a small perturbation can
slightly change the reneging aversion of all agents in the population. In Section 7 we discuss the rele-
vant notions of continuous stability proposed by these authors, and explain why imposing these more
restrictive solution concepts does not affect our results.
Remark 2 (Alternative equilibrium selection). Theorem 2 depends on the equilibrium election function
choosing the most efficient equilibrium in the game in which both agents have reneging cost λ+c . In
what follows, we discuss two possible arguments suggesting that the result can hold also without this
assumption.
1. Discrete set of feasible levels of reneging aversion: Consider the setup in which the set of
feasible levels of reneging aversion are discrete (as described above). In such discrete environments
one can state a result that is essentially the same as Theorem 2, in which λ+c is replaced with the
highest feasible discrete reneging cost that is smaller than λ+c .
2. Focality of the efficient equilibrium: We do not formalise the dynamic process leading a
population to the homogeneous state in which every individual has the level of reneging aversion
λ+c . Intuitively, one plausible way in which the population can converge to λ+c is from a state
in which agents have a lower intermediate level of reneging aversion λ < λ+c , and they play the
unique perfect equilibrium induced by the state λ in which the messages are maximal. As argued
in the proof of part (4), the state λ is vulnerable to a few agents (“mutants”) experimenting with
a higher level of reneging aversion λ′ ∈ (λ, λ+c ), where the mutants also play the unique perfect
equilibrium (with maximal messages) against the incumbents. Such a sequence of invasions of
mutants will take the population to the state in which all agents have a reneging aversion of
λ+c , and along this dynamic sequence the agents play the unique perfect equilibrium, which has
maximal messages. Arguably, it is plausible that also after the population converges to every agent
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having reneging aversion λ+c (and multiple equilibria exist) the agents will continue to play the the
“focal” equilibrium, which is similar to the unique maximum-message equilibrium played against
the previous incumbents with λ < λ+c .
6 Variants and Extensions
Our main model makes the following assumptions: (1) agents send their promises simultaneously, (2) an
agent incurs a reneging cost when his effort is higher than his promise (as well as when it is lower), (3)
the reneging costs of the agent are continuous around zero reneging, and (4) reneging costs are perfectly
observed in the population game. In this section we relax each of these assumptions, and show that
our main results are robust to these changes. Specifically, we show that the equilibrium induced by
the symmetric pair of intermediate levels of reneging aversion
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
still satisfies all the appealing
properties of Theorem 2 except uniqueness, namely: (1) it is a strict Nash equilibrium of the population
game, (2) it induces the second-best symmetric outcome, (3) its outcome converges to the first-best
outcome in the limit, as c converges to one, and (4) its outcome is better than the equilibrium outcome
in the sequential effort choice game without reneging costs.
6.1 Sequential Communication
In this subsection, we examine a variant of the partnership game where promises are sequential rather
than simultaneous. We show that the equilibrium induced by the symmetric pair of intermediate levels
of reneging aversion
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
still satisfies the appealing properties of Theorem 2.
6.1.1 Adaptations to the Model
The partnership game with sequential communication proceeds as follows. In stage 0, nature chooses at
random which player (denoted by i) will be the first to communicate (where each player has a probability
of 50% to be the first). In stage 1, player i sends a message si ∈ [0, 1] to player j and player j observes
this. In stage 2, player j chooses a message sj ∈ [0, 1] to send to player i and player i observes this.
In stage 3, the players simultaneously choose effort levels xi, xj ∈ [0, 1]. Utility levels and material
payoffs are the same functions of messages and effort levels as in the baseline model with simultaneous
communication.
6.1.2 Robustness of Main Results
We now show that the equilibrium induced by the partnership game with sequential communication in
which both players have reneging aversion λ+c induces a unique perfect equilibrium that satisfies the same
appealing properties as in the baseline model:10 (1) “second-best” symmetric outcome, (2) convergence
to “first-best” outcome, (3) strict equilibrium of the population game, and (4) better outcome than that
of the sequential-game equilibrium without reneging costs. Formally:
10We leave for future research the question of whether the population game with sequential communication admits
additional symmetric pure equilibria.
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Proposition 3. Fix c ∈ (1, 1.25). Let (λ+c , λ+c ) be the highest symmetric pair of levels of reneging aver-
sion inducing a maximum-message equilibrium in the simultaneous communication game (as defined in
Theorem 1). The unique subgame-perfect equilibrium induced by
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
under sequential communica-
tion has the following properties:
1. The agents promise maximal efforts, and exert the same level of effort as in the baseline model.
2. “Second-best” outcome: If c < 1.2 then pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> pi
(
λ
′
, λ′
)
for any λ′ 6= λ+c .
3. Convergence to “first-best” outcome: limc→1 pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
= 12 (which is the best feasible material
payoff).
4. Strict equilibrium of population game: pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> pi
(
λ′, λ+c
)
for each λ′ 6= λ+c .
5. Better outcome than that of the sequential-game equilibrium without reneging costs: Let pisi be the
payoff to player i in the unique equilibrium of the game where efforts are chosen sequentially (and
there are no reneging costs). Then, if c < 1.22 then pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> 12 ·
(
pisi + pisj
)
.
Sketch of proof. It turns out that for the combinations of levels of reneging aversion that induce
maximum-message equilibria or two-message equilibria in the game with simultaneous communication,
under sequential communication a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium (which is therefore also trembling-
hand perfect) is induced in which promises (and therefore effort levels and payoffs) are the same as under
simultaneous communication. Therefore, the function pi (λi, λj) takes the the same values in these re-
gions as in the simultaneous game, and the results in relation to these regions carry over to the sequential
communication setting. For combinations of levels of reneging aversion that induce a no-effort equilib-
rium under simultaneous communication, promises, effort levels, and payoffs are weakly greater in the
unique subgame-perfect equilibrium under sequential communication. Yet, it is shown that, despite these
somewhat higher payoffs under these combinations of reneging aversion, it is still not profitable for any
player to deviate from
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
in the population game. Finally, we show that even though with some
symmetric pairs of reneging aversion higher than λ+c there exist some asymmetric equilibria (analogous
to the “two-message” equilibria in the simultaneous communication game) that yield one player a higher
realised payoff than pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
, nevertheless, when the cost of effort is low enough (i.e., when c < 1.2)
the average payoff across the two players in such equilibria (and hence the expected payoff for both
players) is lower than pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
, which therefore remains the “second-best” outcome.
6.2 One-Sided Reneging Costs
In this subsection, we examine a variant of the model in which an agent suffers a reneging cost only
when he exerts less effort in the second stage than he promised in the first. Unlike the baseline model,
an agent does not suffer a cost when he exerts more effort than he promised. This “one-sided” reneging
cost may reflect “guilt” that is proportional to the damage caused to the partner due to the fact that the
agent broke his promise (see, e.g., Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006). When the agent exerts more effort
than he promised, there is no damage to the partner, and thus no guilt. When the agent’s exerted effort
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(xi) is less than his promise (si), then the loss to the partner is xj · (si − xi) , which is proportional to
the difference between the promised and exerted effort.
Our main result in this subsection shows that the equilibrium induced by the symmetric pair of in-
termediate levels of reneging aversion
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
still satisfies most of the appealing properties of Theorem
2. Specifically, we show that
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
is a strict Nash equilibrium of the population game, it induces the
second-best symmetric outcome, it converges to the first-best outcome in the limit when c converges to
one, and it induces a better outcome than the sequential-game equilibrium without reneging costs.
6.2.1 Adaptations to the Model
The material payoffs remain the same as in the baseline model. The reneging cost term in the subjective
utility function of each player i is redefined as follows:
Ui(xi, xj , si, c) = xi · xj − c · x
2
i
2 − 1si>xi
λi
2 (si − xi)
2. (7)
That is, an agent incurs an intrinsic cost of reneging only if his promise is higher than his exerted effort.
In this case, he incurs a quadratic cost analogous to that in the baseline model. All other aspects of the
partnership game remain the same as in the baseline model. We make two assumptions regarding the
equilibrium selection function in cases in which the partnership game admits multiple equilibria:
1. It turns out that the set of equilibria in the symmetric partnership game
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
with one-sided
reneging costs coincides with the set of equilibria in the baseline model with two-sided reneging
costs, and, thus, we apply in this case the same equilibrium selection function as in the baseline
model.
2. Unlike in the baseline model, with one-sided reneging costs, some symmetric partnership games
(λ, λ) (with λ 6= λ+c ) have multiple equilibria. We allow in this case an arbitrary equilibrium
selection function. If an asymmetric equilibrium is selected (in which one of the agents is assigned
to the role of player one, while the partner is assigned to the role of player two), we define pi (λ, λ)
as the mean payoff of the two players’ roles. This corresponds to a homogeneous population of
agents with reneging aversion λ, in which each agent has equal probability of being assigned to
each role in the selected asymmetric equilibrium.
6.2.2 Robustness of Main Results
We now show that the equilibrium induced by λ+c satisfies the same appealing properties as in the
baseline model: (1) “second-best” symmetric outcome, (2) convergence to “first-best” outcome, (3)
strict equilibrium of the population game, and (4) better outcome than that of the sequential-game
equilibrium without reneging costs. Formally:
Proposition 4. Fix c ∈ (1, 1.25). Let (λ+c , λ+c ) be the highest symmetric pair of levels of reneging
aversion inducing a maximum-message equilibrium in the partnership game with two-sided reneging costs
(as defined in Theorem 1). The equilibrium induced by
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
with one-sided reneging costs has the
following properties:
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1. The agents promise maximal efforts, and exert the same level of effort as in the baseline model.
2. “Second-best” outcome: If c < 1.22 then pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> pi
(
λ
′
, λ′
)
for any λ′ 6= λ+c .
3. Convergence to “first-best” outcome: limc→1 pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
= 12 (which is the best feasible material
payoff).
4. Strict equilibrium of the population game: pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> pi
(
λ′, λ+c
)
for each λ′ 6= λ+c .
5. Better outcome than that of the sequential-game equilibrium without reneging costs: Let pisi be the
payoff to player i in the unique equilibrium of the game where efforts are chosen sequentially (and
there are no reneging costs). Then, if c < 1.22 then pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> 12 ·
(
pisi + pisj
)
.
Sketch of proof. We show that in the setup with one-sided reneging costs, a player’s best reply function
either leads him to “renege downward” (i.e., exert effort lower than his promise) in which case the trade-
off he faces is essentially the same as in the game with two-sided costs, or leads him to promise low effort
and then “renege upward” and perfectly undercut his partner by playing xi = xjc . In the game induced
by
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
, a maximum-message equilibrium in which players renege downward and exert effort levels
equal to those in the two-sided case exists and remains unique. For pairs of levels of reneging aversion
that induce a “two-message” equilibrium in the two-sided game, there may exist equilibria in which one
player promises maximum effort and his partner makes a promise of low effort and reneges upward (and
the equilibria with promises and effort levels equal to those in the two-sided case may or may not exist,
depending on the parameters of the game). While the player who makes a promise of ow effort undercuts
“perfectly” in such an equilibrium, the effort levels induced are so low that any player deviating from
λ+c to a level of reneging aversion that induces them to renege upward in equilibrium achieves a lower
payoff than pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
. For this reason, when the cost of effort is low (i.e., when c < 1.22),
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
still
induces the second-best equilibrium outcome.
6.3 Fixed Reneging Costs
In our baseline model we assumed that the reneging cost is proportional to the difference between the
promised and exerted effort. In this subsection, we examine a variant of the model in which an agent
incurs a fixed reneging cost whenever the exerted effort is different from the promised effort, regardless
of the size of the difference. That is, agents care about perfectly keeping their promises. Any reneging
on a promise, regardless of the size of the reneging, incurs the same intrinsic cost to the agent. In what
follows we show that our main results on the appealing properties of intermediate reneging aversion can
be extended to this setup.
6.3.1 Adaptations to the Model
Fix c ∈ (1, 2). For each βi, βj ≥ 0 we define the partnership game with fixed reneging costs βi, βj in the
same way as the partnership game defined in Section 4, except that we change the reneging cost term
such that the subjective utility function of each player i is redefined as follows:
Ui(xi, xj , si, c) = xi · xj − c · x
2
i
2 − βi · 1si 6=xi . (8)
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We interpret βi ≥ 0 as the fixed reneging aversion of player i (i.e., the intrinsic cost he incurs by reneging
on a promise, regardless of the extent of the reneging).
6.3.2 Robustness of Main Results
Observe that the payoff function defined in (8) satisfies all the assumptions of Proposition 1, which
implies that both agents essentially exert no effort in any pure subgame-perfect equilibrium whenever
the fixed reneging costs are either too low or too high.
Our next result shows that for any c ∈ (1, 2), there exists an intermediate level of fixed reneging
aversion, β+c , that induces the players to promise and exert the maximal level of effort as part of a
trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. In particular, this equilibrium induces the first-best outcome (i.e.,
it yields the best feasible symmetric payoff, which maximises the sum of payoffs of the players).
Proposition 5. For any c ∈ (1, 2), there exists an intermediate level of reneging aversion β+c , for
which there exists a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium of the partnership game with fixed reneging costs
βi = βj = β+c , in which both agents promise and exert the maximal effort.
Sketch of proof. Let β+c be the level of fixed reneging aversion, for which an agent who has promised
maximal effort, and believes his partner be exerting maximal effort, is indifferent between exerting
maximal effort (and keeping his promise) and breaking his promise and exerting an effort of 1c (which is
the effort that maximises the agent’s payoff, conditional on breaking his promise). The definition of β+c
implies that following a pair of maximal promises, exerting maximal effort by both players is a second-
stage equilibrium in the induced subgame. Next, consider a deviation of player i to promising effort
si < 1. The fact that agent i promises nonmaximal effort implies that he will exert nonmaximal effort in
any second-stage equilibrium of the induced subgame. One can show that this implies that player j (who
anticipates that her partner will exert nonmaximal effort) strictly prefers exerting nonmaximal effort
(and breaking her promise) to exerting maximal effort (and keeping her promise). Player i therefore
cannot successfully undercut player j at the promising stage, and so this deviation is not profitable.
Remark 3. It is difficult to adapt the evolutionary analysis of the baseline model to this setup, because
the partnership game with fixed reneging costs may admit multiple trembling-hand perfect equilibria,
which makes it difficult to define the payoffs in the induced population game, and to study evolutionary
stability of population states.
6.4 Partial Observability of Reneging Aversion
In this subsection we extend the model endogenising reneging aversion, to allow for cases in which players
sometimes do not observe their partner’s level of reneging aversion.
6.4.1 Population Game with Partial Observability
In what follows, we describe the adaptations to the model of the population game presented in Section 5
(and to its evolutionary interpretation presented in Section 5.3) that are required to accommodate partial
observability. Let q ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of matches in which both players observe their partner’s
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level of reneging aversion. That is, we assume that when the agents are randomly matched into pairs, in
a share q of the pairs both agents observe their partner’s level of reneging aversion, while in the remaining
share 1−q of the pairs the partners are “strangers,” and neither of them observes any information about
their partner’s reneging aversion. One may interpret the observation of reneging aversion to be the
result of obtaining information about a partner’s past behaviour (either through direct observation or
by communicating with agents who interacted with the partner in the past). Under this interpretation,
q may represent the likelihood that agents who are matched together have prior information about each
other.
For tractability, we make the simplifying assumption that the observations of the two matched agents
are perfectly correlated, i.e., that an agent observes his partner’s reneging aversion if and only if the
partner observes the agent’s reneging aversion (similar to the model of partial observability in Heifetz
et al. , 2007a), while leaving the extension to more general observation structures for future research.
Consider a setup in which the incumbent agents have reneging aversion λ ∈ R+, while occasionally
one of the agents is endowed with a different level of reneging aversion (henceforth, a mutant). Let
pino (λ′, λ|λ) be the material payoff of a mutant (he) with a reneging aversion of λ′ who faces an incumbent
partner (she) with a reneging aversion of λ who believes with probability one that her partner has a
reneging aversion of λ. Note that this belief is consistent with a situation in which a single mutant
experiments with a different level of reneging aversion within an infinite population of agents. The
partner plays her part of the unique perfect equilibrium of the game with observability, denoted by
G (λ, λ), while the mutant plays his best reply to her strategy.
Given λ, λ′ ∈ R+, let Gq(λ, λ′|λ) denote a partnership game between an incumbent with reneging
aversion λ and a mutant with reneging aversion λ′ in which both players observe their partner’s reneging
aversion with a probability of q, and neither of them observes their partner’s reneging aversion with the
remaining probability of 1 − q. In this latter case, both players believe with probability one that the
partner has the incumbents’ reneging aversion of λ. Let piq (λ′, λ|λ) be the mutant’s material payoff in
Gq(λ, λ′|λ):
piq
(
λ′, λ|λ) = q · pi (λ′, λ)+ (1− q) · pino (λ′, λ|λ) .
Observe that when q = 1 the current model coincides with the perfect observability described in
Section 5, whereas when q = 0 it corresponds to the nonobservability of the partner’s reneging aversion.
We say that the level of reneging aversion λ ∈ R+ is a symmetric pure (strict) Nash equilibrium
in the population game with partial observability level q if for each λ′ ∈ R+, piq (λ′, λ|λ) ≤ pi (λ, λ)
(piq (λ′, λ|λ) < pi (λ, λ)).
As in the case of perfect observability discussed above, stable homogeneous population states corre-
spond to symmetric pure equilibria of the population game. Specifically:
1. Any symmetric strict equilibrium corresponds to a stable homogeneous population state in which
all the incumbents have the same level of reneging aversion.
2. Any homogeneous stable population state must be a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
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6.4.2 Robustness of Theorem 2
The following result demonstrates the robustness of Theorem 2 to almost perfect observability. It is
immediate that the equilibrium outcome induced by
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
is still a second-best symmetric outcome,
that it converges to the first-best outcome, and that it is better than the sequential-game equilibrium, for
any q ∈ [0, 1] (as the payoff in a homogeneous population is independent of q). In what follows we show
that the remaining results of Theorem 2 hold also for any observability level q < 1 that is sufficiently
close to one. Formally:
Proposition 6. Fix c ∈ (1, 1.25). Let (λ+c , λ+c ) be the highest symmetric pair of levels of reneging
aversion inducing a maximum-message equilibrium (as defined in Theorem 1). Then, there exists q¯ ∈
(0, 1) such that for each q ∈ [q¯, 1], the equilibrium induced by (λ+c , λ+c ) has the following properties:
1. Second-best outcome: pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> pi
(
λ
′
, λ′
)
for any λ′ 6= λ+c .
2. Convergence to first-best outcome: limc→1 piq
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
= 12 .
3. Strict equilibrium of the population game: pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> piq
(
λ′, λ+c |λ+c
)
for each λ′ 6= λ+c .
4. Better outcome than the sequential-game equilibrium outcome: let pisi be the payoff to player i in
the unique equilibrium of the game where efforts are chosen sequentially (and there are no reneging
costs). Then, if c < 1.22 then piq
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> 12 ·
(
pisi + pisj
)
.
6.4.3 Nonrobustness of No-Effort Equilibrium
We recover a central result from the evolutionary literature on the stability of payoff-maximising prefer-
ences under anonymity but show that it is not robust to any positive probability of correlated observation
of preferences in our model. The following simple result shows that when there is no observability (i.e.,
q = 0) no effort is exerted in any equilibrium of the population game. Formally:
Proposition 7. Fix c ∈ (1, 1.25) and q = 0. In any symmetric pure Nash equilibrium of the population
game, all agents exert an effort of zero on the equilibrium path, and any agent i with λi > 0 sends a
message of zero.
This result is similar to those in the existing literature that show that when agents are matched
uniformly and anonymously (i.e., no observability or assortativity) and the selection dynamics are payoff
monotone, then players maximise their material payoffs in any stable population state (see, e.g., Ok &
Vega-Redondo, 2001; Dekel et al. , 2007).11
Next we show that the no-effort equilibrium is not robust to the presence of any arbitrarily low level of
observability. In particular, we show that for any arbitrarily small q > 0, the agents must exert positive
effort on the equilibrium path, which implies that they make positive promises and have a positive level
of reneging aversion.
11A notable exception is Frenkel et al. (2018) who present a plausible model of evolutionary dynamics that are not
payoff-monotone due to sexual inheritance in a biological process, or due to combining traits from more than one mentor in
a social learning process. They show that in such processes, stable population states do not correspond to Nash equilibria
of the underlying material payoff game.
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Proposition 8. Fix c ∈ (1, 1.25) and q > 0. Then, in any symmetric pure Nash equilibrium of the
population game, players exert positive levels of effort on the equilibrium path.
This result demonstrates that even with low levels of observability of reneging aversion, evolutionary
dynamics will take the population away from any cheap talk state in which players are unable to make
and keep promises.
7 Conclusion
We have demonstrated that an intermediate level of reneging aversion is evolutionarily stable and has a
number of appealing properties: it induces a second-best outcome, which converges to the first-best in
the limit of small costs of exerting efforts, and it induces a socially better outcome than the Stackelberg-
leader setup. While our baseline model assumes a specific family of quadratic payoff functions, we have
shown in the previous section that our main results are robust to various relaxations of the model’s
assumptions of sequential communication, one-sided reneging costs, discontinuous reneging costs, and
partial observability. Moreover, the general model of Section 3 shows that our main qualitative insight,
namely, that nonintermediate reneging costs induce zero effort and only intermediate reneging costs have
the potential to obtain efficient outcomes in which agents exert effort, holds under mild assumptions on
the payoff function.
These results demonstrate a strong tendency of evolution to select preferences for the partial keeping
of promises. In stable populations, we see players making slightly “overoptimistic” promises and, while
these are not fully realised, the outcome is welfare-maximising among symmetric equilibria of the game.
This outcome stands in sharp contrast to the cheap talk prediction of no effort ever being exerted in
these partnerships.
We have here developed the first evolutionary analysis of a direct concern for keeping one’s word.
In doing so, we give an evolutionary explanation of several key observations in the related empirical
literature. In our model, a population of players with the stable level of reneging aversion will exert
no effort if they are not allowed to communicate before choosing their actions, but the opportunity
to send messages will lead to promises being made and higher levels of effort being exerted. This
replicates the finding of several experimental studies (Charness & Dufwenberg 2006; Vanberg 2008;
Ederer & Stremitzer 2017; Di Bartolomeo et al. 2018) that players are significantly more likely to make
“cooperative” choices in a partnership setting when they have the ability to communicate before playing,
and that players communicating promises are particularly likely to cooperate.12 Secondly, in the presence
of communication, the degree of cooperation in our model is both incomplete (some reneging always takes
place) and sensitive to the returns from the partnership. The four aforementioned studies all find that:
(1) not all pairs make choices that achieve the cooperative outcome and (2) most players keep promises
to play the cooperative or efficient action but some players break their promise. Additionally, Charness
& Dufwenberg (2006), who vary the value of the outside option from not engaging in the partnership,
12The appendix of Charness & Dufwenberg (2006) provides the text of the messages sent by players and demonstrates
that they were indeed often used to make explicit promises about their own future action. Ederer & Stremitzer (2017) and
Di Bartolomeo et al. (2018) classify communication according to whether or not it constituted a promise and show that
promises are associated with higher total payoffs relative to general forms of communication.
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find that players are less likely to promise and achieve cooperation when the return from not cooperating
is high. The setup in Ederer & Stremitzer (2017) allows agents to choose to “perform” a promised action
to varying degrees (where higher performance reduces their own payoff but increases the social payoff)
and they find substantial amounts of partial reneging, consistent with our modeling of convex reneging
costs.
There is in the experimental literature a debate over whether individuals are inclined to keep their
promises because they have an aversion to breaking their promises per se or because they are averse to
letting down others’ payoff expectations (so-called guilt aversion).13 We lay the theoretical foundations
for both of these accounts of promise-keeping. In our baseline model, the reneging costs can be interpreted
as a cost of promise-breaking per se. In the one-sided variant of Section 6.2, individuals suffer a cost
of reneging only if they exert less effort than promised, and hence cause their partner to have a lower
payoff than if they did not renege, and the cost they experience is proportional to the impact on their
partner’s payoff, such that it can be interpreted as guilt aversion. In both cases, we demonstrate the
evolutionary stability and efficiency of intermediate levels of reneging aversion.
This research lends support to the focus of experimental and theoretical research on direct costs of
lying or reneging on one’s word in communication settings. Future research could explore the robustness
of the stability of intermediate reneging aversion in alternative types of games and with more general
information structures about preferences. Finally, following Alger & Weibull (2013), we conjecture that
evolution under positive assortative matching could support the stability of non-cheap talk preferences
even when preferences are unobserved.
A Trembling-Hand Perfection
In this section we formally define the refinement of trembling-hand perfection in our setup. This refine-
ment requires that the equilibrium behaviour should be a limit of equilibria of perturbed environments
in which the players occasionally make mistakes (“tremble”), where the limit is taken when the error
probability converges to zero.
It turns out that none of our results depend on whether or not players occasionally tremble in the
second stage. Thus, in order to simplify the notation, we present a simpler definition in which players
only tremble in the first stage. Specifically, we study a one-shot game (the promise game), in which agents
simultaneously choose promises si, sj ∈ [0, 1]2 , and the utility of the players Ui (si, sj , c) is determined
by assuming that in the second stage the players must follow the unique second-stage Nash equilibrium
(as defined in Eq. (6)).
Originally, Selten (1975) defined the notion of trembling-hand perfection only for finite games. Be-
cause the set of promises in our setup is a continuum, we follow Simon & Stinchcombe’s (1995) adaptation
of trembling-hand perfection to infinite games (called strong perfect equilibrium in Simon & Stinchcombe,
Definition 1.2).
13Ederer & Stremitzer (2017) and Di Bartolomeo et al. (2018) further distinguish between agents who care about letting
down others’ payoff expectations in general (guilt aversion) and agents who care about letting down others’ expectations
when their promise has caused those expectations to be raised (conditional guilt aversion). In our model, these notions
coincide as payoffs are a function solely of players’ actions.
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Fix c ∈ (1, 2). Let ∆fs ([0, 1]) be the set of (Borel) probability measures on [0, 1] assigning strictly
positive mass to every nonempty open subset of [0, 1]. Given a strategy σj ∈ ∆fs ([0, 1]), let BRci (σ−i) ⊆
[0, 1] be the set of distributions over promises (mixed promises) that are best replies to σ−i (where the
players are assumed to follow the unique Nash equilibrium when choosing their effort levels in the
second-stage of the game), i.e.,
BRci (σj) =
{
argmaxσi∈[0,1]
(
Ui (σi, σ−i, c) ≡
∫
[0,1]2
(σi (si) · σj (sj) · Ui (si, s−i, c)) dsidsj
)}
.
An -perfect equilibrium is a full-support strategy profile in which each player assigns a probability
of at least 1−  to best replies to the opponent’s strategy. Formally:
Definition 2. An -perfect equilibrium is a pair (σ1, σ2) ∈
(
∆fs ([0, 1])
)2
such that for each player
i ∈ {1, 2},
inf
σ˜i∈BRci(σj)
sup (|σi (B)− σ˜i (B) |B measurable|) < .
A perfect equilibrium is a limit of -perfect equilibria as  converges to zero. Formally:
Definition 3. A pair of mixed promises (σ∗1, σ∗2) ∈ (∆ ([0, 1]))2 is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium
if it is the weak limit as n → 0 of a sequence of n-perfect equilibria.
Simon & Stinchcombe (1995, Theorem 2.1) show that the set of perfect equilibria is a closed,
nonempty subset of the set of Nash equilibria of the promise game. The arguments presented in the
proof of Lemma 3 below imply that all Nash equilibria (and hence all perfect equilibria) of the promise
game are pure strategy profiles.
Finally, we say that a subgame-perfect equilibrium
((
s∗i , s∗j
)
,
(
x∗i (−→s ) , x∗j (−→s )
))
of the partnership
game is trembling-hand perfect if the pair of promises
(
s∗i , s∗j
)
is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium
of the induced one-shot promise game.
Remark 4. In our analysis we follow the main solution concept introduced by Simon & Stinchcombe
(1995), namely, strong perfect equilibrium. Simon & Stinchcombe, at the end of Section 1.1, argue that
this notion best captures the strategic structure of infinite games. Their alternative notion, weak perfect
equilibrium, replaces the strong metrics with the weak metrics in Definition 2. Weak perfection has no
bite in our setup: any subgame-perfect equilibrium of the partnership game satisfies weak perfection.
Specifically, consider the region Λcmax in which each player’s best reply is overcutting his partner’s
promise (i.e., BRci (sj) = min (ai · sj , 1) for some ai > 0). The intuitively unstable Nash equilibrium
of the promise game (0, 0) satisfies weak perfection: if the partner uses a totally mixed strategy with
expectation ai , then the message 0 is  away from the unique best reply message , which is sufficient for
(0, 0) to be a weak trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. By contrast, the message 0 is never a best reply
to a totally mixed message sent by the partner, which implies that it is not a (strong) trembling-hand
perfect equilibrium.
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B Further Discussion of Our Evolutionary Model
In this appendix we discuss two issues related to our evolutionary interpretation of the population game:
(1) mixed and asymmetric equilibria, and (2) refinements of continuous stability.
B.1 Mixed and Asymmetric Equilibria in the Population Game
Our formal results above focused primarily on symmetric pure equilibria. In what follows we comment
on the extension of our results to mixed and asymmetric equilibria.
Theorem 2 shows that
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
is the unique symmetric and pure equilibrium of the population
game. Numeric analysis suggests the following stronger result also holds. The population game does
not admit any other Nash equilibrium (i.e.,
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
is uniquely stable when we allow also for mixed
equilibria and asymmetric equilibria).14 We leave the analytic analysis of this conjecture (which, we
believe, holds also for partial observability with a sufficiently high q) for future research.
It is relatively straightforward to extend Propositions 7 and 8 to mixed equilibria and to asymmetric
equilibria. We refrain from doing so in order to simplify the notation of Section 6.4 (the formal definition
of symmetric equilibria requires a somewhat more complicated notation). The arguments presented in
the proofs of both propositions hold with minor changes also for mixed and asymmetric equilibria, and it
can be shown that: (1) if q = 0, then all incumbents exert zero effort in any equilibrium of the population
game, and (2) for any q > 0 in any equilibrium of the population game, a positive share of incumbent
agents exert positive effort with positive probability (and hence make positive promises, and are endowed
with positive reneging aversion). Thus, the endowment of players with positive levels of reneging aversion
in stable population states is a robust property that holds for any positive level of partial observability
(at least with the simplifying assumption of perfect correlation between the observations of the two
matched agents).
B.2 Refinements of Continuous Stability
By using strict equilibrium and Nash equilibrium as our solution concepts describing stable population
states, we implicitly assume that a stable population state has to be resistant only to perturbations in
which a few agents change their level of reneging aversion. Eshel (1983) argues that in some setups one
should also require stability against perturbations in which many (or all) agents slightly change their
reneging aversion. Eshel presents the notion of a continuous stable strategy to capture stability also
against the latter class of perturbations, and Oechssler & Riedel (2001) further refine it by presenting
the notion of evolutionary robustness, which requires stability against all small perturbations consistent
with the weak topology (see also the related notions of stability in Milchtaich, 2016). Population state λ∗
is evolutionarily robust if an agent with cost λ∗ outperforms other agents (on average) in any sufficiently
14The extension to asymmetric equilibria is especially interesting in setups in which the partnership game is played between
agents from two different populations of complementary skills, and a stable state of the two populations corresponds to a
possibly asymmetric Nash equilibrium of the two-population game (see the related setup studied in Ritzberger & Weibull,
1995).
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close perturbed population state µ ∈ ∆ (R+), i.e.,
∑
λ∈∆(µ)
µ (λ) · pi (λ∗, λ) >
∑
λ,λ′∈∆(µ)
µ (λ) · µ (λ′) · pi (λ, λ′) . (9)
One can show that the population state
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
satisfies a slightly weaker version of the evolutionary
robustness refinement of (9). Specifically, it satisfies the weak inequality counterpart of Eq. (9) for any
sufficiently close µ ∈ ∆ (R+), and it satisfies the strict inequality whenever µ assigns positive mass to
agents having a reneging aversion of at most λ+c . The intuition is that agents with a slightly higher
reneging aversion (i.e., strictly above λ+c ) play a no-effort equilibrium against all agents in the perturbed
state µ. Thus, they are trivially weakly outperformed by a level of aversion λ+c , and strictly outperformed
as long as µ includes some agents with a reneging aversion of at most λ+c (against whom an agent with
reneging aversion λ+c achieves strictly positive payoffs). Finally, minor modifications to the arguments
presented in the proof of Theorem 2 show that agents with a reneging aversion strictly below λ+c are
strictly outperformed by agents with a reneging aversion of λ+c .
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C Additional Figures (For Online Publication)
The appendix presents additional figures demonstrating: (1) how the value of λ+c , level of effort, fitness,
and subjective payoff change as a function of the cost of effort c, and (2) the best-reply types and the
equilibrium types for four additional values of cost of effort c: 1.05, 1.15, 1.24, and 1.26.
C.1 Intermediate Reneging Aversion λ+c and Equilibrium Values as a Function of c
Figure 3 shows how the value of λ+c = 1+2c−2c
2
2(c−1) +
√
5−4c
2(c−1) depends on the cost of effort c.
Figure 3: The Intermediate Reneging Aversion λ+c as a Function of the Cost of Effort c
Figure 4 shows the level of effort, xi, the material payoff of each player, pii, and the subjective
utility of each player, Ui, as a function of the cost of effort, c, in the unique equilibrium induced by the
partnership game in which both players have the intermediate level of reneging aversion λ+c .
Figure 4: Equilibrium Effort, Fitness and Payoff as a Function of the Cost of Effort c
1
C.2 Best-Reply Types and the Unique Perfect Equilibrium Types
Figure 5 presents the best-reply types for player i in the reneging aversion parameter space for four
costs of effort c: 1.05, 1.15, 1.24, and 1.26. Figure 6 presents the unique perfect equilibrium types in
the reneging aversion parameter space for the same four costs of effort. (The values of 1.1 and 1.2 are
presented in Figures 1 and 2 in Section 4.)
2
(a) c = 1.05 (Scale of each axis is [0,20]) (b) c = 1.15
(c) c = 1.24 (d) c = 1.26
Figure 5: Best-Reply Types for Player i in a Reneging Aversion Parameter Space. The
x axis in each figure presents the player’s level of reneging aversion (λi) and the y axis presents the
partner’s level of reneging aversion (λj). The dark area in each panel is the region in which player i’s
best reply is to undercut the partner, i.e., s∗i (sj) < sj ; the light area in each panel is the region in
which player i’s best reply is to overcut the partner, i.e., s∗i (sj) > sj . The dashed line in each panel
shows the value λj = λ¯c ≡ 2−c2c−1 > 0 presented in Proposition 2, above which player i’s best reply is
to undercut his partner regardless of the value of λi.
3
(a) c = 1.05 (scale of each axis is [0,20]) (b) c = 1.15
(c) c = 1.24 (d) c = 1.26
Figure 6: Unique Perfect Equilibrium Types in a Reneging Aversion Parameter Space.
The x axis in each panel presents the player’s level of reneging aversion (λi) and the y axis presents
the partner’s level of reneging aversion (λj). The dark areas in each panel are the regions in
which both agents exert no effort in equilibrium (“No Effort”). The light area in each panel is the
region in which both agents promise maximal efforts in the unique perfect equilibrium (“Maximum
Message”); this region is empty in the case of c = 1.26. The remaining areas are the regions in
which one of the agents sends a maximal promise (“2 Message”).
4
D Proofs (For Online Publication)
D.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Fix x > c. For each xi ∈ [x, b] and each xj ∈ [a, xi] define
f (xi, xj) = max
x′i∈[a,xi]
(
pii
(
x′i, xj
)− pii (xi, xj)) .
The assumption that pi(xi, xj) is continuously differentiable implies that f (xi, xj) is continuous in both
parameters. The assumptions that xi > c, xi ≥ xj , max (BRpi (xj)) ≤ c if xj ≤ c, and max (BRpi (xj)) <
xj if xj > c imply that f (xi, xj) > 0. Define
˜ = min
xi∈[x,b], xj∈[a,xi]
f (xi, xj) .
The compactness of the set
{
(xi, xj) ∈ [a, b]2 |xi ∈ [x, b] , xj ∈ [a, xi]
}
and the continuity of f (xi, xj)
imply that ˜ > 0. Fix xi ∈ [x, b] and xj ∈ [a, xi]. Let x′i ∈ BRpi (xj). Let  = ˜2 . Then the definition of ˜
implies that
pi
(
x′i, xj
)− pi (xi, xj) ≥ ˜ > ,
which proves that pi encourages shirking above c.
D.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We first prove point (1) (namely, that the equilibrium efforts are at most c+  if λi, λj < λ). Fix
 > 0. The fact that function pi encourages shirking above c implies that there exists δ > 0 such that
for each xi ≥ c+  and each xj ≤ xi there exists x′i ≤ xi such that pi (x′i, xj) > pi (xi, xj) + δ. Let λ be
sufficiently small such that λ ·D (b− a) < δ2 . Assume that there is a pure subgame-perfect equilibrium
(−→s ∗,−→x ∗ (−→s )) of the partnership game with levels of reneging aversion λi, λj ≤ λ in which agent i exerts
effort of at least c+ , i.e., x∗i (−→s ∗) ≥ c+ . Assume without loss of generality that x∗i (−→s ∗) ≥ x∗j (−→s ∗) .
The fact that pi encourages shirking above c implies that there exists x′i satisfying
pi(x′i, x∗j (−→s ∗)) > pi(x∗i (−→s ∗) , x∗j (−→s ∗)) + δ,
which implies that
U(x′i, x∗j (−→s ∗) , s∗i , λi) > pi(x∗i (−→s ∗) , x∗j (−→s ∗)) + δ −
δ
2 > U(x
∗
i (−→s ∗) , x∗j (−→s ∗) , s∗i , λi),
where the first inequality is due to λ ·D (b− a) < δ2 . Thus, we get a contradiction to x∗i (−→s ∗) being a
second-stage best-reply against x∗j (−→s ∗).
We now prove point (2) (namely, that the equilibrium efforts are at most c +  if λi, λj > λ). Let
′ > 0 be sufficiently small such that (b− a) ·M · ′ < δ4 and ′ < 8 (where M is the constant from the
definition of Lipschitz continuity). Let λ > 0 be sufficiently large such that λ ·D (′) > 2 ·M . Assume
that there is a pure subgame-perfect equilibrium (−→s ∗,−→x ∗ (−→s )) of the partnership game with levels of
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reneging aversion λi, λj ≥ λ in which agent i exerts effort of at least c+ , i.e., x∗i (−→s ∗) ≥ c+ . Assume
without loss of generality that x∗i (−→s ∗) ≥ x∗j (−→s ∗). The fact that the function pi encourages shirking
above c implies that there exists δ > 0 such that for each x∗i ≥ c+ and each x∗j ≤ x∗i there exists x′i ≤ x∗i
such that pi
(
x′i, x∗j
)
> pi
(
x∗i , x∗j
)
+ δ. The fact that λ ·D (′) > 2 ·M implies that x∗j
(
s′i, s∗j
)
≥ s∗j − ′
for each s′i ∈ [0, 1]. This, in turn, implies that
∣∣∣x∗j (s′i, s∗j)− x∗j (s∗)∣∣∣ ≤ 2 · ′ for each s′i, s′′i ∈ [0, 1] .
Consider the deviation of player i to promising x′i in the first round and exerting effort x′i in the
second round. We complete the proof by showing that this deviation induces a higher payoff to the
deviator relative to the equilibrium behaviour (which contradicts (−→s ∗,−→x ∗ (−→s )) being a subgame-perfect
equilibrium):
U
(
(x′i, x∗j
(
si = x′i, s∗j
)
, s∗i , λi)
)
= pi(x′i, x∗j
(
si = x′i, s∗j
)
) ≥ pi(x′i, x∗j (s∗))−(b− a)·M ·2·′ ≥ pi(x′i, x∗j (s∗))−
δ
2
≥ pi(x∗i , x∗j (s∗))−
δ
2 + δ ≥ U
(
(x∗i , x∗j (s∗) , s∗i , λi)
)
+ δ2 .
D.3 Definitions of Notation Used in the Remaining Proofs
For ease of exposition, we define the following notation, used in several of the subsequent proofs:
Θi ≡ c(c+ λj) + 1(c+ λi)(c+ λj) − 2, Ri ≡

λj
Θi
Θi > 0
∞ Θi ≤ 0.
Throughout the proofs we define the product of ∞ and 0 to be equal to ∞. That is, when Ri =∞
and Rj = 0, we define Ri ·Rj =∞.
D.4 Proof of Proposition 2
This section consists of several lemmas used in the proof of Proposition 2, followed by the proof itself.
D.4.1 Lemma Characterising the Best-Reply Correspondence
Lemma 3. Let µσj denote i’s expectation of sj in the first stage of the partnership game when player j
chooses a mixed strategy σj ∈ ∆ ([0, 1]) in the first stage (i.e., a distribution over the set of messages).
The best-reply correspondence in the first stage is15
15The choice of the best reply in the latter “knife-edge” case, in which Θi = λj · µσj = 0, does not play any role in our
results. In all other cases, the unique best-reply function of both players always induces them to choose a pure message
and, as a result, both players choose pure messages in all equilibria. This justifies the focus on pure strategies in the main
text.
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s∗i (µσj , λi, λj , c) =

min{λjΘi · µσj , 1} Θi > 0 and λi > 0
1 [Θi < 0 or (Θi = 0 and λj · µσj > 0)] and λi > 0
[0, 1] [Θi = 0 and λj · µσj = 0] or λi = 0.
(10)
Proof. To derive player i’s first stage best reply, we substitute the equations for equilibrium second-stage
effort levels (Eq. (5)) into the utility function to obtain utility as a function of si and sj :
Ui(si, sj , c) =
[(c+ λj)λisi + λjsj ][(c+ λi)λjsj + λisi]
[(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1]2
− c[(c+ λj)λisi + λjsj ]
2
2[(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1]2 −
λi
2
[
si − (c+ λj)λisi + λjsj(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1
]2 (11)
When λi = 0, player i’s choice of message has no bearing on his optimal effort choice or that of his
partner and thus does not impact his utility. Therefore, any si is a best reply to any µσj (and indeed
any sj). When λi > 0, the first derivative of player i’s utility function with respect to si, taking µσj as
given, is a linear function of si and µσj :
∂Ui(si, µσj , c)
∂si
=
[
2− c(c+ λj)− 1(c+ λi)(c+ λj)
]
si + λj · µσj = −Θisi + λj · µσj (12)
Given that λj and µσj are constrained to be (weakly) positive, the second term in Eq. (12) is also
(weakly) positive. Therefore, when Θi > 0 (and hence the term multiplying si in Eq. (12) is strictly
negative), the utility function is everywhere strictly concave in si, and the following level of si, which is
positive and satisfies the first-order condition ∂Ui(si,µσj ,c)∂si = 0, is a necessary and sufficient condition for
a global maximum of the utility function:
si(µσj , λi, λj , c) =
λj
Θi
· µσj (13)
Further, the strict concavity of the utility function in si means that when
λj
Θi
· µσj > 1, the optimal
choice of si is 1.
When Θi < 0 (and hence the term in si in Eq. (12) is strictly positive), the utility function is
everywhere strictly increasing and convex in si. In this case, the optimal choice of si is 1, for all µσj ∈ S.
When Θi = 0, if λj > 0 and µσj > 0, then again the utility function is everywhere strictly increasing and
convex in si and the optimal choice of si is 1. If Θi = 0 and either λj = 0 or µσj = 0, then the utility
function is flat in si and any message is a best reply to the opponent’s message.
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D.4.2 Conditions for the Existence of Each Best-Reply “Type”
Lemma 4. Θi ≤ 0 (which implies that player i’s best reply is to send the maximum message) if and
only if
λi ≥ 1(c+ λj)(2− c(c+ λj)) − c and λj <
2
c
− c.
Proof. By the definition of Θi:
Θi ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ c(c+ λj) + 1(c+ λi)(c+ λj) − 2 ≤ 0
⇐⇒ c(c+ λj)(c+ λi) + 1(c+ λj) − 2(c+ λi) ≤ 0
⇐⇒ λi(c(c+ λj)− 2) ≤ 2c− 1
c+ λj
− c2(c+ λj)
⇐⇒ λi(c(c+ λj)− 2) ≤ − 1
c+ λj
− c(c(c+ =⇒ λj)− 2),
where the second ⇐⇒ is obtained by multiplying by (c + λi) and the third and fourth by gathering
terms in λi and rearranging. To solve for λi we then divide by (c(c+ λj)− 2). There are two solutions:
one for when (c(c+ λj)− 2) is positive and one for when it is negative:
λi ≤ −1(c+ λj)[c(c+ λj)− 2] − c < 0, and c(c+ λj)− 2 > 0, (14)
λi ≥ 1(c+ λj)[2− c(c+ λj)] − c > 0, and c(c+ λj)− 2 < 0. (15)
We can see that the solution given by Eq. (14) implies that λi < 0, which is ruled out by assumption.
Therefore, we have that Θi ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ Eq. (15) holds. Rearranging the second inequality in Eq. (15) to
give a condition in terms of λj yields the lemma.
Lemma 5. λjΘi > 1 (which implies that player i sends a message that is some multiple (greater than 1)
of player j’s message) if and only if
1
λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c < λi
AND
((
λi <
1
(c+ λj)(2− c(c+ λj)) − c
)
or
(
2
c
− c ≤ λj < 2− c
2
c− 1
))
.
Proof. By the definition of Θi,
λj
Θi
> 1 ⇐⇒ λj
c(c+ λ−i) + 1(c+λi)(c+λj) − 2
> 1. (16)
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Since λj ≥ 0, this holds if and only if
λj > c(c+ λj) +
1
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)
− 2 > 0. (17)
The second of these inequalities is the requirement that Θi > 0, which is the converse of the condition
derived for Lemma 4, and this second inequality holds when
λi <
1
(c+ λj)[2− c(c+ λj)] − c or λj ≥
2
c
− c. (18)
The first inequality in Eq. (17) holds if and only if
λj >c(c+ λj) +
1
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)
− 2
⇐⇒λj + 2− c(c+ λj) > 1(c+ λi)(c+ λj) ⇐⇒ (c+ λi) (λj + 2− c(c+ λj)) >
1
(c+ λj)
⇐⇒λi(λj + 2− c(c+ λj)) > −c(λj + 2− c(c+ λj)) + 1
c+ λj
. (19)
The second ⇐⇒ is obtained by multiplying by (c+ λi), and the first and third by rearranging. To solve
for λi, we divide by (λj + 2 − c(c + λj)). There are two solutions: one for when (λj + 2 − c(c + λj)) is
positive and one for when it is negative:
λi >
1
(λj + 2− c(c+ λj)) (c+ λj) − c > 0 and λj + 2− c(c+ λj) > 0, (20)
λi <
1
(λj + 2− c(c+ λj)) (c+ λj) − c < 0 and λj + 2− c(c+ λj) < 0. (21)
We can see that the solution given by Eq. (21) implies that λi < 0. This is ruled out by assumption,
and so we have that the first inequality in Eq. (17) ⇐⇒ Eq. (20) holds. Rearranging the inequalities
in Eq. (20) yields
λi >
1
λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c > 0 and λj < 2− c
2
c− 1 . (22)
Combining the inequalities in Eqs. (22) and (18) and observing that 2c − c = 2−c
2
c <
2−c2
c−1 , and that
therefore 0 < λi <
1
(c+ λj)(2− c(c+ λj)) − c ⇒ λj <
2−c2
c−1 , yields the lemma.
Lemma 6. 0 < λjΘi < 1 (which implies that player i sends a message that is some fraction (less than 1)
of player j’s message) if and only if
λi <
1
λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c or λj ≥ 2− c
2
c− 1 .
Proof. The inequality 0 < λjΘi < 1 implies that Θi > 0 and so Eq. (18) must hold. We also must have
9
that λjΘi < 1. In the proof of Lemma 5 it was demonstrated that
λj
Θi > 1 ⇐⇒ Eq. (22) holds. By taking
the converse of Eq. (22) we have that λjΘi < 1 if and only if
λi <
1
λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c or λj ≥ 2− c
2
c− 1 . (23)
From the proof of Lemma 5, we have that Θi > 0 if and only if
λi <
1
(c+ λj)[2− c(c+ λj)] − c or λj ≥
2
c
− c. (24)
To see that Eq. (23) implies that Θi > 0, first note that as 2c − c = 2−c
2
c <
2−c2
c−1 , the second inequality
in Eq. (23) implies the second inequality in Eq. (24). Next, we see that if λj ≥ 2c − c then we clearly
have the second inequality in Eq. (24). If instead λj < 2c − c then, given 2c − c = 2−c
2
c <
2−c2
c−1 , Eq. (23)
implies that the first inequality in Eq. (23) holds, which in turn implies the first inequality in Eq. (24):
1
λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c < 1(c+ λj)[2− c(c+ λj)] − c
⇐⇒ 1
λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
<
1
(c+ λj)[2− c(c+ λj)]
⇐⇒ (c+ λj)[2− c(c+ λj)] <λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
⇐⇒ 2c− c2 − λjc2 + 2λj − λjc2 − λ2jc <λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
⇐⇒ 0 <λ2j + λ2jc.
Therefore, Θi > 0 is implied by λjΘi < 1 and so we obtain the lemma.
D.4.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We prove each point in turn:
1. Observe that c ≥ √2 =⇒ 2−c2c−1 ≤ 0. Given that λj ≥ 0, we therefore have λj ≥ 2−c
2
c−1 . Lemma 6
shows that if λj ≥ 2−c2c−1 then 0 <
λj
Θi < 1. Lemma 3 implies that if λi > 0 and 0 <
λj
Θi < 1 and
sj > 0, then s∗i (sj |λi, λj , c) < sj . We therefore have that c ≥
√
2 =⇒ s∗i (sj |λi, λj , c) < sj , for each
sj > 0 and λi > 0.
2. Define λ¯c ≡ 2−c2c−1 . Then by the definition of λ¯c and the assumption that λj ≥ λ¯c we have that
λj ≥ 2−c2c−1 and the same steps as in part 1 yield result (a). Now, let
x (λj , c) =
1
λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c.
Then, under the assumption that 0 < λi < x (λj , c), Lemma 6 implies that 0 < λjΘi < 1 and the
same steps as in part 1 yield result (b) i. If we instead assume that λi > x (λj , c), Lemma 4 and
Lemma 5 imply that either Θi ≤ 0 or λjΘi > 1. In both of these cases, Lemma 3 implies that
s∗i (sj |λi, λj , c) > sj , given that 0 < sj < 1, and this yields result (b) ii.
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D.5 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Observe that each partnership game is identified by a pair (λi, λj) and, by the definition of Ri (in
Appendix D.3), each partnership game (and each pair (λi, λj)) corresponds to a unique pair (Ri, Rj).
Let
Λc0−eff ≡
{
(λi, λj) ⊆ [0,∞)2 : Ri ·Rj < 1
}
,
Λcmax ≡
{
(λi, λj) ⊆ [0,∞)2 : min (Ri, Rj) > 1
}
, and
Λc2−msg ≡
{
(λi, λj) ⊆ [0,∞)2 : Ri ·Rj > 1 > min (Ri, Rj)
}
\
{(
0, 1 + c
4 − 2c2
c (2− c2)
)
,
(
1 + c4 − 2c2
c (2− c2) , 0
)}
.
The two points that we removed from the set Λc2−msg correspond to the cases in which (I) Θi = λj = 0
and (II) Θj = λi = 0, in which any pair of messages induce a perfect equilibrium of the partnership
game (see Lemma 3). Recall that when Ri = ∞ and Rj = 0, we define Ri · Rj to be equal to ∞. Note
that these sets are pairwise disjoint and symmetric. We now prove each point of the theorem in turn.
1. By the definition of Λc0−eff ,Λcmax, and Λc2−msg, we have
Cl
(
Λc0−eff
)
=
{
(λi, λj) ⊆ [0,∞)2 : Ri ·Rj ≤ 1
}
,
Cl (Λcmax) =
{
(λi, λj) ⊆ [0,∞)2 : min (Ri, Rj) ≥ 1
}
, and
Cl
(
Λc2−msg
)
=
{
(λi, λj) ⊆ [0,∞)2 : Ri ·Rj ≥ 1 ≥ min (Ri, Rj)
}
.
Either Ri · Rj ≤ 1 or Ri · Rj ≥ 1 (or both). If Ri · Rj ≥ 1 then either min (Ri, Rj) ≥ 1 or
Ri ·Rj ≥ 1 ≥ min (Ri, Rj) (or both). Therefore,
Cl
(
Λc0−eff
)
∪ Cl (Λcmax) ∪ Cl
(
Λc2−msg
)
= [0,∞)2.
2. We demonstrate each result in turn.
(a) (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0−eff =⇒ Ri ·Rj < 1. If Ri ·Rj < 1, then, by the definition of Ri and Rj , Θi > 0
and Θj > 0 and λjΘi ·
λi
Θj < 1. First consider the case where λi = λj = 0. Fact 1 demonstrates
that x∗i (−→s ∗) = x∗j (−→s ∗) = 0. Next, consider λi > λj = 0. The best-reply correspondence
derived in Lemma 3 implies that in this case s∗i =
λj
Θi ·µσj = 0. Substituting s∗i = 0 and λj = 0
into the equilibrium effort functions given by Eq. (5) yields x∗i (−→s ∗) = x∗j (−→s ∗) = 0. Finally,
consider λi, λj > 0. By the best-reply correspondence derived in Lemma 3, equilibrium
messages in this class of games satisfy s∗i =
λj
Θi sj and s
∗
j = λiΘj si. Given that
λj
Θi ·
λi
Θj < 1, these
equations are jointly satisfied if and only if s∗i = s∗j = 0, which is therefore the unique subgame-
perfect equilibrium pair of messages. Substituting these messages into Eq. (5) yields that
x∗i (−→s ∗) = x∗j (−→s ∗) = 0 in the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. We have demonstrated
that x∗i (−→s ∗) = x∗j (−→s ∗) = 0 in every subgame-perfect equilibrium with (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0−eff , and
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that λk > 0 implies that s∗k = 0. As observed at the end of Appendix A, every trembling-
hand perfect equilibrium is a subgame-perfect equilibrium, and so any trembling hand perfect
equilibrium has these properties.
(b) (λi, λj) ∈ Λc2−msg =⇒ Ri · Rj > 1 > min (Ri, Rj). Assume without loss of generality that
Rj < Ri. If Ri ·Rj > 1 > Rj then, by the definition of Ri and Rj , either (i) Θi < 0, Θj > 0,
and λiΘj < 1, or (ii) Θi = 0, Θj > 0, λj > 0, and
λi
Θj < 1, or (iii) Θi > 0, Θj > 0, and
λj
Θi ·
λi
Θj > 1. In case (i) Lemma 3 implies that equilibrium messages satisfy s
∗
i = 1. If λj > 0,
then by Lemma 3 s∗j = λiΘj si, and these equations are simultaneously satisfied if and only if
1 = s∗i > s∗j > 0. In case (ii), Lemma 3 implies that equilibrium messages satisfy s∗i = 1 if
µσj > 0 and s∗i ∈ [0, 1] if µσj = 0 and s∗j = λiΘj si. These equations are simultaneously satisfied
if and only if 1 = s∗i > s∗j > 0 or s∗i = s∗j = 0. In case (iii), Lemma 3 implies that equilibrium
messages satisfy s∗i = min{ λjΘi sj , 1} and s∗j =
λi
Θj si. Given that
λj
Θi ·
λi
Θj > 1, these equations
are simultaneously satisfied if and only if 1 = s∗i > s∗j > 0 or s∗i = s∗j = 0. In all three cases (i,
ii, and iii), there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which 1 = s∗i > s∗j > 0. This is the
unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in case (i) and therefore it must satisfy trembling-hand
perfection.
In cases (ii) and (iii) there exists also a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which s∗i = s∗j = 0.
Next we show that this latter subgame-perfect equilibrium ((0, xe1 (s1, s2)) , (0, xe2 (s1, s2)))
fails to satisfy trembling-hand perfection in cases (ii) and (iii). Assume to the contrary that
((0, xe1 (s1, s2)) , (0, xe2 (s1, s2))) satisfies trembling-hand perfection. This implies that (0, 0)
is the weak limit as n → 0 of a sequence of n-perfect equilibria
(
σni , σ
n
j
)
of the promise
game. This implies, in particular, that for each  > 0, there exists an -perfect equilibrium
(σi, σj) ∈ ∆fs ([0, 1]) 2 such that σi (1) , σj (1) < . We begin by considering case (ii). The
fact that σj has full support implies that µσj > 0 and that BRci (σj) = {1}. The definition
of an -perfect equilibrium implies that σi (1) , σj (1) > 1 − , and we get a contradiction for
each  < 0.5. We are left with case (iii), in which Rj < Ri <∞ andRi ·Rj > 1. The fact that
(0, 0) is the weak limit of a sequence of n-perfect equilibria
(
σni , σ
n
j
)
when n → 0 implies
that for each  > 0, there exists an -perfect equilibrium (σi, σj) ∈
(
∆fs ([0, 1])
)2
such that
σi
([
1
Ri
, 1
])
, σj
([
1
Ri
, 1
])
< . The fact that σj has full support implies that µσj > 0. Observe
that BRci (σj) =
{
Ri · µσj
}
. The fact that (σi, σj) is an -perfect equilibrium implies that
σi
(
Ri · µσj
)
≥ 1 − , which implies that µσi ≥ (1− ) · Ri · µσj . The fact that (σi, σj) is an
-perfect equilibrium implies that σj (Rj · µσi) ≥ 1− , which implies that
µσj ≥ (1− ) ·Rj · µσi ≥ (1− )2 ·Ri ·Rj · µσj ,
which yields the contradiction µσj > µσj for a sufficiently small  that satisfies (1− )2·Ri·Rj >
1.
(c) (λi, λj) ∈ Λcmax =⇒ min (Ri, Rj) > 1. If min (Ri, Rj) > 1, then, by the definition of Ri
and Rj , either (i) Θi,Θj > 0, and λjΘi ,
λi
Θj > 1 , or (ii) Θi > 0 = Θj and
λj
Θi > 1, or (iii)
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Θi > 0 > Θj and λjΘi > 1 , or (iv) Θi = Θj = 0, or (v) Θi = 0 > Θj , or (vi) Θi,Θj < 0.
In case (i), by the best-reply correspondence derived in Lemma 3, equilibrium messages in
this class of games satisfy s∗i = min{ λjΘi sj , 1} and s∗j = min{
λi
Θj si, 1}. These equations are
simultaneously satisfied if and only if s∗i = s∗j = 0 or s∗i = s∗j = 1. In case (ii), Lemma
3 implies that equilibrium messages satisfy s∗i = min{ λiΘj si, 1} and s∗j = 1 if µσj > 0 and
s∗j ∈ ∆(S) if µσj = 0. These equations are simultaneously satisfied if and only if s∗i = s∗j = 1.
In case (iii), Lemma 3 implies that equilibrium messages satisfy s∗i = min{ λiΘj si, 1} and s∗j = 1
. These equations are simultaneously satisfied if and only if s∗i = s∗j = 1. In case (iv), Lemma
3 implies that equilibrium messages satisfy s∗i = 1 if µσj > 0 and s∗i ∈ [0, 1] if µσj = 0 and
s∗j = 1 if µσi > 0 and s∗j ∈ [0, 1] if µσi = 0. These equations are simultaneously satisfied if and
only if s∗i = s∗j = 0 or s∗i = s∗j = 1. In case (v), Lemma 3 implies that equilibrium messages
satisfy s∗i = 1 if µσj > 0 and s∗j = 1. These equations are simultaneously satisfied if and only
if s∗i = s∗j = 1. In case (vi), Lemma 3 implies that equilibrium messages satisfy s∗i = 1 and
s∗j = 1, which implies that s∗i = s∗j = 1.
This implies that in all six cases (i, ii, iii, iv, v, and vi) the strategy profile
((1, xe1 (s1, s2)) , (1, xe2 (s1, s2))) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium. It is unique (and thus sat-
isfies trembling-hand perfection) in cases (ii), (iii), (v), and (vi). In cases (i) and (iv), the
strategy profile ((0, xe1 (s1, s2)) , (0, xe2 (s1, s2))) is the only additional subgame-perfect equilib-
rium.
Finally, we have to show that the additional equilibrium ((0, xe1 (s1, s2)) , (0, xe2 (s1, s2))) fails
to satisfy trembling-hand perfection in cases (i) and (iv). The proof of this claim in case
(i) is completely analogous to the proof that ((0, xe1 (s1, s2)) , (0, xe2 (s1, s2))) fails to satisfy
trembling-hand perfection in case (iii) of part (b) above, and the proof of this claim in case
(iv) is completely analogous to the proof that ((0, xe1 (s1, s2)) , (0, xe2 (s1, s2))) fails to satisfy
trembling-hand perfection in case (ii) of part (b) above.
3. Lemma 6 says that if λj ≥ 2−c2c−1 then 0 <
λj
Θi < 1, which implies that Ri < 1. Therefore, if
c ≥ √2 =⇒ 2−c2c−1 ≤ 0, then Ri ·Rj < 1 for all (λi, λj) and so Λc0−eff = [0,∞)2.
4. Let xcλi = max
{
1
(c+ λj)(2− c(c+ λj)) − c,
2−c2
c−1
}
. Given that c <
√
2, there exists 0 ≤ λj < 2c−c.
Lemma 4 says that if λj < 2c − c and λi > xcλi then Θi ≤ 0, and hence Ri = ∞ (using the first
part of the maximum function defining xcλi). Given that λi >
2−c2
c−1 > 0, we have by Lemma 6 that
1 > Rj > 0 and so Ri ·Rj > 1 > Rj and so (λi, λj) ∈ Λc2−msg.
5. We prove each point in turn. (I) The proof proceeds by showing that the set Λcmax is a convex
set. Convexity and symmetry then imply that if Λcmax is nonempty then there is a λ such that
(λ, λ) ∈ Λcmax. We then show that such a λ exists only if c < 1.25. By the definition of Ri, we
recall that Ri ≥ 1 if and only if (1) Θi ≤ 0 or (2) Θi > 0 and λjΘi ≥ 1. We can recall from Lemma
4 that Θi ≤ 0 if and only if
λi ≥ 1(c+ λj)(2− c(c+ λj)) − c and λj <
2
c
− c.
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We can recall from Lemma 5 that Θi > 0 and λjΘi ≥ 1 if and only if
1
λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c < λi
AND
((
λi <
1
(c+ λj)(2− c(c+ λj)) − c
)
or
(
2
c
− c ≤ λj < 2− c
2
c− 1
))
.
Combining these conditions yields Ri ≥ 1 if and only if
λi ≥ 1
λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c and λj < 2− c
2
c− 1 . (25)
We will now show that the set of points that satisfy Eq. (25) is convex. First, observe that the
second derivative of the right-hand side of the first inequality of Eq. (25) (the lower bound on λi)
with respect to λj is
2[3c4 + (6λj − 3)c3 + (3λ2j − 9λj − 5)c2 + 3λ2j + 6λj + 4]
(λj + c)[2− c2 − λj(c− 1)] . (26)
The numerator of this expression is positive for all λj > 0 and16 c > 1 . This expression is therefore
positive if and only if the denominator is positive, which clearly holds if and only if the expression
in square brackets is positive:
2− c2 − λj(c− 1) > 0 ⇐⇒ λj < 2− c
2
c− 1 .
This is the second inequality of Eq. (25). Therefore, the set of points that satisfy Eq. (25) lies
above a strictly convex function and is therefore a convex set. By the symmetry of the conditions
for player j, we have that the set of points such that Rj > 1 is also convex. The intersection of
two convex sets is a convex set. Therefore the set of points such that min (Ri, Rj) > 1 (Λcmax) is
convex.
We now establish the interval of c in which Λcmax is nonempty. By the convexity and symmetry
of Λcmax, if this set is nonempty there must be a maximum and a minimum λ such that (λ, λ) ∈
Cl (Λcmax). We now show that such maximum and minimum elements exist if and only if c < 1.25.
Clearly, the maximum and minimum λ such that (λ, λ) ∈ Cl (Λcmax) are the largest and smallest
values of λ such that the weak counterpart of Eq. (25) holds when λi = λj = λ. Given that
Cl (Λcmax) is convex and closed, these maximum and minimum values must obtain when at least
one of the inequalities in Eq. (25) holds with equality. To find the maximum and minimum
values of λ that satisfy the first inequality in Eq. (25), we solve the corresponding equation
when λi = λj = λ. We then show that these are the largest and smallest values satisfying both
16Eq. (26) and the conditions for the positive numerator are derived using Mathematica. The code is available in the
supplementary appendix of this paper.
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inequalities simultaneously. Imposing λi = λj = λ on the first inequality in Eq. (25), we obtain
λ = 1
λ2(1− c) + λ(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2) − c. (27)
Multiplying by λ2(1− c) + λ(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2) and rearranging yields
λ3
[
1− c
]
+ λ2
[
2 + 2c− 3c2
]
+ λ
[
4c− 3c3 + c2
]
−
[
c2 − 1
]2
= 0. (28)
Eq. (28) has two solutions when λ is positive:
λ = 1 + 2c− 2c
2
2(c− 1) −
√
5− 4c
2(c− 1) ≡ λ
−
c (29)
λ = 1 + 2c− 2c
2
2(c− 1) +
√
5− 4c
2(c− 1) ≡ λ
+
c (30)
Clearly, these two solutions are defined if and only if c < 1.25. By inspection of Eq. (29) and
Eq. (30), it is straightforward to see that for all 1 < c < 1.25, 0 < λc < λ+c < ∞. To see point
(II) we then simply note that by the definition of Rk, λi = λj implies that Ri > 1 ⇐⇒ Rj > 1
and either min(Ri, Rj) ≥ 1 or Ri, Rj < 1 =⇒ Ri · Rj < 1 =⇒ (λ, λ) ∈ Λc0−eff . Therefore,
given that Λcmax = ∅ when c > 1.25, we have that (λ, λ) ∈ Λc0−eff for λ ≥ 0. To see (III) first
note that Lemma 6 implies that if λi, λj ≥ 2−c2c−1 then Ri·Rj < 1 and (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0−eff . It is
straightforward to see that 2−c2c−1 is decreasing for c > 1 and obtains the value 1.75 when c = 1.25.
Therefore λi, λj > 1.75 =⇒ (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0−eff for c ∈
(
1.25,
√
2
)
. Next, note that Lemma 6 implies
that if λi <
1
λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c and the expression holds also with i and
j interchanged then Ri·Rj < 1 and (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0−eff . We now derive a lower bound on the
value taken by the right-hand side of this inequality. The second derivative of this expression with
respect to λj is strictly positive for all λj < 2−c
2
c−1 for all c ∈
(
1.25,
√
2
)
and hence this function is
strictly convex in λj and achieves at most its global minimum over this interval17 0 ≤ λj < 2−c2c−1 .
We next derive this minimum value by setting the first derivative of this function with respect to
λj equal to zero, solving for λj . and substituting this into the function. This yields a lower bound
as a function of c:
4c2 − c3 − 4
(c− 2)2 . (31)
The first derivative of this expression with respect to c is
8− 16c+ 6c2 − c3
(c− 2)3 .
17This fact is proven using Mathematica. The code used to prove this fact is available in the online appendix.
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This expression is positive for all18 c ∈
(
1.25,
√
2
)
. Therefore, the lower bound takes its lowest
value (with respect to c) when c takes its lowest value, i.e., c = 1.25. Evaluating Eq. (31) at
c = 1.25 gives a value of 1936 ≈ 0.53. Therefore, λi, λj < 1936 ≈ 0.53 =⇒ (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0−eff for
c ∈
(
1.25,
√
2
)
.
6. Let λ−c = 1+2c−2c
2
2(c−1) −
√
5−4c
2(c−1) and λ
+
c = 1+2c−2c
2
2(c−1) +
√
5−4c
2(c−1) . Then we can see that points (I) and (II)
are proven in the proof of the previous part (part 5). To see (III), note first that by the definition
of λ−c and λ+c as the minimum and maximum λ (respectively) such that (λ, λ) ∈ Cl(Λcmax) and by
the convexity of Λcmax, we have that (λ, λ) /∈ Cl(Λcmax) for each λ ∈ [0, λ−c ) ∪ (λ+c ,∞). Assume
that there exist λi, λj < λ−c such that (λi, λj) ∈ Λcmax. By the symmetry of Λcmax, we have that
(λj , λi) ∈ Λcmax. Let λk = λi+λj2 <λ−c . By the convexity of Λcmax, we have that (λk, λk) ∈ Λcmax,
which is a contradiction. This establishes that (λi, λj) ∈ Λcmax implies that λ−c ≤ max (λi, λj). By
assuming that there exist λi, λj > λ+c such that (λi, λj) ∈ Λcmax, we can derive a contradiction in
an analogous way. Finally, we consider the case where λ−c < λi ≤ λ+c ≤ λj . We have established
in the proof of the previous part (part 5) that the right-hand side of the first inequality in Eq.
(25) (which gives the condition for Ri > 1) is strictly convex and crosses the 45 degree line for the
second time at λi = λj = λ+c , which implies that for all λj ≥ λ+c this function is increasing in λj
and so Ri > 1 =⇒ λi > λ+c , which is a contradiction. We therefore have that λ+c ≤ max (λi, λj)
implies that (λi, λj) /∈ Λcmax and hence (λi, λj) ∈ Λcmax implies that max (λi, λj) < λ+. To see
(IV), let λc = 2−c
2
c−1 and observe that Lemma 6 implies that if λi, λj > λc then 0 <
λj
Θi < 1 and
0 < λiΘj < 1 and so Ri ·Rj < 1 and so (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0−eff . Let
Zc ≡ min
λ< 2−c2
c−1
{ 1
λ2(1− c) + λ(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2) − c
}
= 4c
2 − c3 − 4
(c− 2)2 ,
where the equality is derived in the proof of part 5 (III) of the theorem (Eq. (31)). Assume that
Zc > 0 and let λc = Zc. By equivalent arguments to those in the proof of part 5 (III), we then
have that λi, λj < λc =⇒ (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0−eff . Assume conversely that Zc ≤ 0 and let λc = λ−c .
Observe that given the strict convexity of the right-hand side of the first inequality in Eq. (25)
and the definition of λ−c as the first of two points at which this function crosses the 45 degree line,
we must have that this function is strictly decreasing for λj < λ−c and hence λi, λj < λ−c implies
that Ri < 1. By the symmetry of the condition defining Rj < 1 we have that λi, λj < λ−c implies
that Rj < 1 and hence λi, λj < λc implies that Ri ·Rj < 1 and hence (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0−eff . Therefore,
given that 0 < λ−c for c ∈ (1, 1.25), letting λc = Zc if Zc > 0 and λc = λ−c if Zc ≤ 0, we have that
λi, λj < λc implies that (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0−eff .
18This fact is proven using Mathematica. The code used to prove this fact is available in the online appendix.
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D.6 Corollary of Theorem 1
We formalise one corollary of Theorem 1, which says that if players’ levels of reneging aversion are
identical and positive, they send the same message in the unique perfect equilibrium of the partnership
game. This corollary is used in some subsequent proofs.
Corollary 1. Let λi = λj > 0. Then the equality si = sj holds in the unique perfect equilibrium of the
partnership game.
Proof. For λi, λj > 0, Theorem 1 shows that the only cases (those in the Λc2−msg) where si 6= sj are
those where Ri · Rj > 1 > Rj . This implies that Ri 6= Rj . By the definition of Θi, we see that
λi = λj ⇒ Θi = Θj . By the definition of Ri, we see that λi = λj and Θi = Θj together imply that
Ri = Rj . Therefore λi = λj ⇒ Ri = Rj , which implies that si = sj .
D.7 Corollary of Theorem 1 and Lemma 3
Theorem 1 characterises unique equilibria in all but a “measure-zero” set of points of the reneging aversion
space that correspond to the boundaries of the three sets defined in the theorem. We demonstrate that
at the two points (λ−c , λ−c ) and (λ+c , λ+c ) (where λ−c = min{λ : (λ, λ) ∈ Cl(Λcmax)} and λ+c = max{λ :
(λ, λ) ∈ Cl(Λcmax)}), any pair of identical messages sent by the players can be supported as a perfect
equilibrium when c < 1.25. This result is used in the results of Section 5. The other boundary points
do not play a role in our analysis and we refrain from analysing them for the sake of brevity.
Corollary 2. Let c ∈ (1, 1.25) and let λi = λj = λ. (1) If λ = λ−c or λ = λ+c then
(
(s, s′) ,
(
x∗i (−→s ) , x∗j (−→s )
))
is a perfect equilibrium of the partnership game if and only if s = s′. (2) If
(
(1, 1) ,
(
x∗i (−→s ) , x∗j (−→s )
))
is a perfect equilibrium of the partnership game then (λ, λ) ∈ Cl(Λcmax).
Proof. Part 1: The proof of part 5 of Theorem 1 demonstrates that by the definitions λ−c = min{λ :
(λ, λ) ∈ Cl(Λcmax)} and λ+c = max{λ : (λ, λ) ∈ Cl(Λcmax)}, we have that both λi = λj = λ+c and
λi = λj = λ−c imply that Ri = Rj = 1. The best-reply correspondence derived in Lemma 3 then implies
that s∗i = µσj and s∗j = µσi , which are jointly satisfied if and only if s∗i = s∗j . In order to see that(
(s∗, s∗) ,
(
x∗i (−→s ) , x∗j (−→s )
))
is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, observe that for each  > 0 there
exists an -perfect equilibrium (σ, σ) ∈
(
∆fs ([0, 1])
)2
satisfying σ (s∗) = 1 −  and µσ = s∗, which
implies that (s∗, s∗) is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium of the promise game. Part 2: This follows
from the definitions of λ−c and λ+c (λ−c = min{λ : (λ, λ) ∈ Cl(Λcmax)} and λ+c = max{λ : (λ, λ) ∈
Cl(Λcmax)}) and from the fact that Λcmax is a convex set (part 6 (I) of Theorem 1) and so its closure is
too.
D.8 Proof of Theorem 2
This section consists of several lemmas used in the proof of Theorem 2, followed by the proof itself.
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D.8.1 Lemma: Positive Payoff Always Possible in the Population Game
Lemma 7. Fix c ∈ (1, 1.25). For all λj ≥ 0 there exists λi ≥ 0 such that in any perfect equilibrium of
the partnership game (λi, λj), player i achieves a strictly positive material payoff, i.e., pi(λi, λj) > 0.
Proof. Theorem 1 and the definition of Λcmax and Λc2−msg imply that if Ri =∞, or Rj =∞, or Ri·Rj > 1,
then either si = 1 or sj = 1 in the unique equilibrium of the partnership game when λi, λj > 0 and in
any equilibrium when λi > λj = 0. We show that for all λj ≥ 0 there exists λi ≥ 0 such that at least
one of these conditions holds.
We first show that if λj > 81140 then setting λi = 0 yields Θj < 0, which, by definition, implies
Rj = ∞. To see this, first use the definition of Θj to write the condition Θj < 0 when λi = 0, and
rearrange it to yield a lower bound on λj :
c2 + 1(c+ λj)c
− 2 < 0 ⇐⇒ 1
c+ λj
< c
(
2− c2
)
⇐⇒ 1
c (2− c2) − c < λj . (32)
The first derivative of this lower bound with respect to c is
3c2 − 2
(2c− c3)2 − 1. (33)
Eq. (33) is positive for c < 1.25. The lower bound on λj given by Eq. (32) therefore attains its
highest value when c = 1.25. This value is 81140 ≈ 0.578. We therefore have that for all λj >
81
140 , λi = 0
implies that Θj < 0 and hence Rj =∞.
We next show that for λj ≤ 81140 , then for λi sufficiently large, either Θi ≤ 0 or Ri ·Rj > 1. We take
the limit of Θi as λi →∞ and find the conditions under which this is negative:
lim
λi→∞
Θi ≤ 0⇐⇒ c(c+ λj)− 2 ≤ 0⇐⇒ λj ≤ 2
c
− c. (34)
Next, we check the condition for satisfying λi·λjΘj ·Θi > 1, which implies that Ri · Rj > 1. We take the
limit of λi·λjΘi·Θj as λi →∞:
lim
λi→∞
λi · λj
Θi ·Θj = limλi→∞
 λi
c(c+ λj) + 1(c+λi)(c+λj) − 2
· λj
c(c+ λi) + 1(c+λi)(c+λj) − 2

= lim
λi→∞
[
λi
c(c+ λj)− 2 ·
λj
c(c+ λi)− 2
]
= lim
λi→∞
[
λi
c(c+ λj)− 2 ·
λj
c · λi
]
= lim
λi→∞
[
λi · λj
c · λi (c(c+ λj)− 2)
]
= lim
λi→∞
[
λj
c [c(c+ λj)− 2]
]
= λj
c [c(c+ λj)− 2] ,
where the second equality is derived from neglecting the term 1(c+λi)(c+λj) , which converges to zero as
λi →∞, in each denominator, and the third equality is derived by neglecting the term c2 − 2, which is
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negligible with respect to c · λi when taking the limit λi →∞, in the second denominator.
We then determine the conditions under which this limit is greater than 1:
λj
c [c(c+ λj)− 2] > 1⇐⇒ c(c+ λj)− 2 > 0 and λj < c [c(c+ λj)− 2]
⇐⇒ 2
c
− c < λj < c
c2 − 1 − c. (35)
Observe that the first inequality in Eq. (35) holds precisely when Eq. (34) does not hold. The first
derivative of the right-hand side of the second inequality in Eq. (35) is c2−c4−2(c2−1)2 , which is clearly negative
for all c > 1. When evaluated at c = 1.25, the right-hand side of the second inequality in Eq. (35) is
35
36 >
81
140 . Therefore, for all c < 1.25 and λj ≤ 81140 , this second inequality holds. We therefore have that
for all c < 1.25 and λj ≤ 81140 , either Θi ≤ 0 or
λi·λj
Θj ·Θi > 1, when λi is sufficiently high. Therefore, for
all c < 1.25 and for all λj ≥ 0, there exists a λi ≥ 0 such that either si = 1 or sj = 1 in the unique
equilibrium of the game (λi, λj) (or in any equilibrium of the game when either λi = 0 or λj = 0). To
demonstrate that player i achieves positive payoff in equilibrium, we first note that in each of the above
cases, there is at least one player who both sends a positive message and (due to part 3 of Theorem 1)
has strictly positive reneging aversion, which by Eq. (5) implies that both players exert strictly positive
effort in equilibrium. Observe that a player can always guarantee a utility level of zero by playing
si = xi = 0. Further, observe that if λi > 0 then, by Lemma 3, the uniqueness of the best reply implies
that either Θi > 0 or [Θi < 0 or (Θi = 0 and λj · µσj > 0)], and therefore the utility function is either
strictly concave or strictly increasing (respectively) in si. This implies that if λi > 0 and the best reply
s∗i is positive (i.e., s∗i > 0) and unique, then it must yield strictly positive utility for player i. In the
case where λi = 0, given that x∗i > 0 and the strict concavity of the utility function in xi and the fact
that playing xi = 0 guarantees a utility level of zero, the utility of player i must be strictly positive in
equilibrium.
D.8.2 Lemma: Additional Properties of Λcmax
Lemma 8. Fix c ∈ (1, 1.24). (1) For all λ ∈ [λ−c , λ+c ), there exists δλ > 0 such that for all λ
′ ∈ (λ, λ+δλ),
(λ′ , λ) ∈ Λcmax (2) For all λ
′ 6= λ+c , (λ
′
, λ+c ) /∈ Cl(Λcmax).
Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 yields Eq. (25) and the corresponding condition for player j, which
together define Λcmax. The strict convexity of the first inequality of Eq. (25) defining the boundary of
Λcmax, implies that for all λ ∈ (λ−c , λ+c ), (λ, λ) is not on the boundary of Λcmax and is therefore in the
interior of Λcmax (i.e., it is in Λcmax but not in Cl(Λcmax)) . By the definition of an interior point of a
convex set, for all λ ∈ (λ−c , λ+c ), there exists δλ > 0 such that for all λ
′ ∈ [λ, λ+ δλ), (λ′ , λ) ∈ Λcmax. We
next show that there exists δλ > 0 such that for all λ
′ ∈ (λ−c , λ−c + δλ), (λ
′
, λc) ∈ Λcmax. This will be the
case if and only if there is δλ > 0 such that Eq. (25) holds whenever λi = λ−c and λj ∈ [λ−c , λ−c + δλ).
This will be the case if and only if Eq. (25) does not become “tighter” as λj increases, i.e., if and only
if the derivative of the right-hand side of the first inequality of Eq. (25) is less than or equal to zero
when evaluated at λj = λ−c . The derivative of the right-hand side of the first inequality of Eq. (25) with
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respect to λj is
c(2c+ 2λj − 1)− 2(1 + λj)
(λj + c)2[λj(c− 1) + c2 − 2]2 . (36)
When evaluated at λj = λ−c , Eq. (36) is nonpositive if19 c >
√
5− 1 ≈ 1.24. Therefore, we have that
for all λ ∈ [λ−c , λ+c ), there exists δλ > 0 such that for all λ
′ ∈ (λ, λ+ δλ), (λ′ , λ) ∈ Λcmax.
Point (2) is established by noting first that the right-hand side of the first inequality of Eq. (25) must
be increasing in λj when evaluated at λ+c (and at any λ > λ+c ) as this is the second point at which this
strictly convex function crosses the 45 degree line (the first being λ−c ). Therefore, given that λ+c satisfies
Eq. (27), an increase in λj with λi fixed at λ+c means that the weak counterpart of Eq. (25) does not
hold. By symmetry, an increase in λi with λj fixed at λ+c means that the equivalent condition on λj is
violated. Secondly, it is straightforward to see that given that λ+c satisfies Eq. (27), when λj is fixed at
λ+c , any λi < λ+c must violate the weak counterpart of the first inequality in Eq. (25). Therefore, for
any λ′ 6= λ+c , min(Ri, Rj) < 1 and so (λ
′
, λ+c ) /∈ Cl(Λcmax).
D.8.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We prove each part of the theorem in turn.
1. By the definition of Ri, λi = λj =⇒ Ri = Rj , which in turn implies that either max {Ri, Rj} < 1
and hence Ri·Rj < 1 and (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0−eff or min {Ri. Rj} ≥ 1 and hence (λi, λj) ∈ Cl(Λcmax).
Therefore, λi = λj =⇒ (λi, λj) ∈ Cl (Λcmax) ∪ Λc0−eff . For any λ such that (λ, λ) ∈ Λc0−eff ,
xi = xj = 0 and so pi(λ, λ) = 0. To find the material payoff when (λ, λ) ∈ Cl(Λcmax), we recall Eq.
(1) for material payoff, and impose xi = xj = x on the equation, which yields
pi(λ, λ) = x2 − cx
2
2 , (37)
which is clearly positive and increasing in x for all c < 2. The level of reneging aversion that
maximises the material payoff in a symmetric game is therefore that which maximises equilibrium
effort. Theorem 1 tells us that for (λ, λ) ∈ Λmax, si = sj = 1 in the unique equilibrium. For
(λ, λ) ∈ Cl(Λmax)\Λmax, Corollary 2 tells us that any si = sj ∈ [0, 1] is supported as an equilibrium
and by our equilibrium selection assumption we have that si = sj = 1. We therefore impose
si = sj = 1 and λi = λj = λ on the equation for equilibrium effort (Eq. 5):
(c+ λ)λ+ λ
(c+ λ)(c+ λ)− 1 =
λ
c+ λ− 1 . (38)
The derivative of this expression with respect to λ is
(c+ λ− 1)− λ
[c+ λ− 1]2 =
(c− 1)
[c+ λ− 1]2 , (39)
which is clearly positive for all c > 1. Therefore, the reneging cost that maximises effort, and
19This final result is obtained using Mathematica. The code is available in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
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therefore maximises the material payoff, in a symmetric game is the highest λ such that (λ, λ) ∈
Cl(Λcmax). By definition, this is λ+c .
2. Recall that
λ+c =
1 + 2c− 2c2
2(c− 1) +
√
5− 4c
2(c− 1) =
1 + 2c(1− c) +√5− 4c
2(c− 1) . (40)
Note that as c → 1, the numerator of Eq. (40) is increasing and the denominator of Eq. (40)
converges to zero. Hence limc→1 λ+c = ∞. To find the limit of the players’ material payoff in the
game (λ+c , λ+c ) as c→ 1, we substitute the expression for effort in a maximum message equilibrium
(Eq. 38) into that for material payoff in a symmetric equilibrium (Eq. (37)) when λ = λ+c :
pi(λ+c , λ+c ) = [
λ+c
c+ λ+c − 1]
2[1− c2]. (41)
As c→ 1, λ+c →∞ and therefore the limit of Eq. (41) is given by
lim
c→1pi(λ
+
c , λ
+
c ) = lim
c→1[
λ+c
c+ λ+c − 1]
2[1− c2] = (1−
1
2) =
1
2 . (42)
3. We first show that any unilateral deviation from the candidate equilibrium to a lower level of
reneging aversion yields a strictly lower payoff, i.e., pi
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
< pi(λ+c , λ+c ) for λ
′ ∈ [0, λ+c ) . Point
(2) of Lemma 8 implies that for all λ′ ∈ [0, λ+c ),
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
/∈ Cl(Λcmax). Therefore for all such
deviations,
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
∈ Cl
(
Λc2−msg
)
or
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
∈ Cl
(
Λc0−eff
)
. Suppose first that
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
∈
Λc0−eff . Then the effort levels of both players are zero and so we have pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> pi(λ′ , λ+c ) =
0. Suppose instead that
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
∈ Λc2−msg; the payoff to the deviating player is obtained by
substituting the expression for equilibrium effort (Eq. 5) into the expression for material payoff
(Eq. 1) and imposing the conditions si = λjΘi and sj = 1 and λj = λ
+
c (player i is therefore the
deviating player ):
pii(λi, λ+c ) =
[(c+ λ+c )λi
λj
Θi + λ
+
c ][(c+ λi)λ+c + λi
λj
Θi ]
[(c+ λi)(c+ λ+c )− 1]2
− c[(c+ λ
+
c )λi
λj
Θi + λ
+
c ]2
2[(c+ λi)(c+ λ+c )− 1]2
. (43)
The derivative of this expression with respect to λi is20
[λ+c ]2(c(λ+c + c)− 1)2
[1 + (c+ λ+c )(c+ λi)(c(λ+c + c)− 2)]3
. (44)
Clearly, the numerator of Eq. (44) is always positive. A sufficient condition for the denominator,
and hence for the whole expression, to be strictly positive is that
c(λ+c + c)− 2 > 0 ⇐⇒ λ+c >
2
c
− c. (45)
20This derivative was calculated using Mathematica. The code is available in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
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This always holds as
λ+c =
1 + 2c− 2c2
2(c− 1) +
√
5− 4c
2(c− 1) >
2
c
− c
⇐⇒ 1 + 2c− 2c2 +√5− 4c > 4(c− 1)
c
− 2c(c− 1)
⇐⇒ − 3 +√5− 4c+ 4
c
> 0
⇐⇒ c < 1.25,
where the final ⇐⇒ follows from the fact that √5− 4c is positive and defined if and only if
c < 1.25 and 4c − 3 is positive for all c < 1.33. Therefore, pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> pi(λ′ , λ+c ) for any λ
′ ∈
[0, λ+c ) such that
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
∈ Λc2−msg. Finally, suppose that
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
∈ {Cl(Λ2−msg) \ Λ2−msg} ={(
λi, λ
+
c
) ⊆ [0,∞)2 : Ri ·Rj = 1 > Ri}. By Lemma 3 we have that any equilibrium will satisfy
si = λjΘi sj and sj = min
{
λj
Θi si, 1
}
. Substituting the expression for equilibrium effort (Eq. 5) into
the expression for material payoff (Eq. 1) and imposing this form of best reply yields utility to
player i (the deviating player):
pii(λi, λ+c ) =
 [(c+ λ+c )λi λjΘi + λ+c ][(c+ λi)λ+c + λi λjΘi ]
[(c+ λi)(c+ λ+c )− 1]2
− c[(c+ λ
+
c )λi
λj
Θi + λ
+
c ]2
2[(c+ λi)(c+ λ+c )− 1]2
 s2j . (46)
Clearly, the highest possible payoff to player i in any possible equilibrium is that where sj = 1.
In this case, the equilibrium payoff is of the same form as Eq. (43) and, by the above arguments,
it cannot represent a profitable deviation. We therefore have that pi
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
< pi(λ+c , λ+c ) for
λ
′ ∈ [0, λ+c ). We now show that a unilateral deviation from the candidate equilibrium to a higher
reneging aversion yields a strictly lower payoff, i.e., pi
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
< pi(λ+c , λ+c ) for λ
′
> λ+c . By Lemma
8, λ′ > λ+c implies that
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
/∈ Cl (Λcmax) . Suppose first that
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
∈ Λc0−eff . In this case,
the effort levels of both players are zero and so we have pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> pi(λ′ , λ+c ) = 0. Suppose
instead that
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
∈ Λc2−msg. In this case, the payoff to the deviating player is obtained by
substituting the expression for equilibrium effort (Eq. 5) into the expression for material payoff
(Eq. 1) and imposing the conditions si = 1 and sj = λiΘj and λj = λ
+
c (player i is therefore the
deviating player):
pii(λi, λ+c ) =
[(c+ λ+c )λi + λ+c λiΘj ][(c+ λi)λ
+
c
λi
Θj + λi]
[(c+ λi)(c+ λ+c )− 1]2
−
c[(c+ λ+c )λi + λ+c λiΘj ]
2
2[(c+ λi)(c+ λ+c )− 1]2
. (47)
In the supplementary appendix of this paper, we present the explicit formula for the deriva-
tive of Eq. (47) with respect to λi and the Mathematica code proving that this derivative is
strictly negative for all λi > λ+c . Hence, for any λi > λ+c such that (λi, λ+c ) ∈ Λc2−msg, we
have that pi
(
λi, λ
+
c
)
< pi(λ+c , λ+c ). Finally, suppose that
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
∈ {Cl(Λ2−msg) \ Λ2−msg} ={(
λi, λ
+
c
) ⊆ [0,∞)2 : Ri ·Rj = 1 > Rj}. By arguments analogous to the case where λi < λ+c , we
have that the maximum possible payoff from deviating in this case is of the form given by Eq. (47)
and therefore not profitable. Hence for any λi > λ+c , pi
(
λi, λ
+
c
)
< pi(λ+c , λ+c ).
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Therefore, we have shown that any possible deviation from the pure strategy equilibrium (λ+c , λ+c )
yields the deviating player a strictly lower payoff and hence this equilibrium is strict.
4. In the sequential game (with no reneging costs) let player i make his effort choice first with
player j best-replying to this. Then, in equilibrium, xj = argmax
xj
{
xixj − c·x
2
j
2
}
= xjc and hence
xi = argmax
xi
{
x2i
c −
c·x2i
2
}
= argmax
xi
{
(2−c2)xi
2c
}
= 1, where the last equality follows from the fact
that c < 1.25. Therefore, in an equilibrium with sequential effort choices, xi = 1, xj = 1c , and the
mean payoff is 1c − c4(1 + 1c2 ) = 3−c
2
4c . The payoff to either player in the equilibrium induced by
(λ+c , λ+c ) is given by Eq. (41). We then have that
pi(λ+c , λ+c ) >
1
2 ·
(
pisi + pisj
)
⇐⇒[ λ
+
c
c+ λ+c − 1]
2[1− c2] >
3− c2
4c
⇐⇒c < 1.22.
The final step is proven using Mathematica.21
5. Recall from part 1 that λi = λj =⇒ (λi, λj) ∈ Cl(Λcmax) ∪ Λc0−eff . We consider these two sets of
symmetric strategy profiles in turn and show that no candidate equilibria of the population game
survive other than (λ+c , λ+c ) when c ∈ (1, 1.24). For any λ such that the unique equilibrium in
the corresponding partnership game (λ, λ) ∈ Λ0−eff , we have that pi (λ, λ) = 0. Lemma 7 shows
that for c < 1.25 and for λ ≥ 0, there exists λ′ ≥ 0 such that pi
(
λ
′
, λ
)
> 0. Therefore, for all
λ such that pi (λ, λ) = 0, (λ, λ) cannot be a Nash equilibrium of the population game. For any λ
such that (λ, λ) ∈ Cl(Λcmax), we say that such an equilibrium “admits an upward deviation within
Λcmax” if there exists δλ > 0 such that for all λ
′ ∈ (λ, λ+ δλ), (λ′ , λ) ∈ Λcmax . For all λ such that
(λ, λ) ∈ Cl(Λcmax), the equilibrium payoff to both players is obtained by substituting si = sj = 1
into Eq. (11):
pii(λi, λj) =
[(c+ λj)λi + λj ][(c+ λi)λj + λi]
[(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1]2 −
c[(c+ λj)λi + λj ]2
2[(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1]2 . (48)
The first derivative of this function with respect to λi is
(c− 1)(1 + c+ λj)[λic3 + 2c2λiλj + cλi(λ2j − λj − 2)− λj(1 + λi(2 + λj))]
[c2 − 1 + λiλj + c(λi + λj)]3 . (49)
Imposing the condition λi = λj = λ, we can simplify this expression to22
(c− 1)[c(c+ λ− 1)− 1− λ]λ
[c+ 1 + λ][c− 1 + λ]3 . (50)
21The code available in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
22The derivative given by Eq. (49) and its simplification when λi = λj is obtained using Mathematica. The code available
in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
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This expression is strictly positive if and only if
c(c+ λ− 1)− 1− λ > 0 ⇐⇒ λ < 1 + c− c
2
c− 1 . (51)
Recall from Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 that a maximum-message equilibrium exists only if
min(Ri, Rj) ≥ 1 and that this requires that either Θi ≤ 0 or λjΘi ≥ 1 (and that the analogous
conditions hold for j). By Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 each of these conditions implies that
λj <
2− c2
c− 1 . (52)
Therefore, when λi = λj = λ, we have that
λ <
2− c2
c− 1 <
1 + c− c2
c− 1 , (53)
where the second inequality clearly follows when c > 1. We can see that this yields the second
inequality in Eq. (51) and hence Eq. (50) is always positive in a maximum-message equilibrium.
Therefore, for any λ such that (λ, λ) “admits an upward deviation within Λcmax,” there exists some
λ
′
> λ such that pi
(
λ
′
, λ
)
> pi(λ, λ) and hence no such strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium of
the population game. We have shown that the only potential symmetric pure Nash equilibria of
the population game are those that admit a maximum-message equilibrium and do not “admit an
upward deviation within Λcmax.” Lemma 8 implies that there is a unique pair (λ+c , λ+c ) that fulfills
these conditions when c ∈ (1, 1.24).
D.9 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. We solve for the subgame-perfect equilibria of this game using backwards induction. Best replies
and equilibrium choices of effort in the last stage are the same function of prior-stage messages as in the
games with simultaneous communication and are given by Eq. (4) and Eq. (5). Utility as a function
of messages is therefore given by Eq. (6). We first note that Section 4.3 demonstrated that if Θi ≤ 0
then (other than in the “knife edge” case where Θk = 0 and λl · sl = 0 for k = i and l = j or for k = j
and l = i), regardless of player j’s choice of message, player i’s level of utility is always increasing in his
message, and his optimal choice is si = 1 for any message sent by j. In the “knife edge” cases where
Θi = 0 (i.e., where player i is the first player to make a promise) and Rj 6= 0 and λj 6= 0, then player j
will respond to any positive promise with sj = min{Rjsi, 1} > 0, meaning that i’s utility is convex and
increasing in his message and he chooses si = 1. In the “knife edge” cases where Θj = 0 and Ri 6= 0,
player i knows that playing si > 0 will induce sj = 1. Given that playing si = min{Risj , 1} is a best
reply when taking sj = 1 as given in the simultaneous game, it must also be a best reply in the sequential
game. Therefore, if either Θi ≤ 0 or Θj ≤ 0 or both of these conditions hold, equilibrium messages and
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effort levels will be the same under sequential communication as under simultaneous communication.23
In the case where Θi,Θj > 0, the second-stage best reply of player j (the second player to make
a promise) is derived in the same way as the first-stage best reply under simultaneous communication,
except that instead of the expectation of player i’s promise, we derive the best reply as a function
of his actual promise. From the analysis in Section 4.3 we therefore know that player j will choose
sj = min{Rjsi, 1}.
Next, we analyse the choice of player i taking j’s second-stage best reply function as given. First, we
show that when Θi,Θj > 0, there exists no equilibrium in which si ∈ (0,min{ 1Rj , 1}). Note that when
Θi,Θj > 0, then Rj <∞ and so, for si ∈ (0,min{ 1Rj , 1}), inserting the best reply sj = min{Rjsi, 1} =
Rjsi into Eq. (5) and substituting this into player i’s utility function yields
Ui(si, c) =
[(c+ λj)λisi + λjRjsi][(c+ λi)λjRjsi + λisi]
[(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1]2
− c[(c+ λj)λisi + λjRjsi]
2
2[(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1]2 −
λi
2
[
si − (c+ λj)λisi + λjRjsi(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1
]2
=Ψ (λi, λj , c) s2i .
(54)
Here, Ψ (λi, λj , c) is a function of the parameters λi, λj , c only. Therefore, if there exists s
′
i ∈
(0,min{ 1Rj , 1}) such that Ui(s
′
i, c) > 0, then Ui(si, c) < Ui(min{ 1Rj , 1}, c) for all si ∈ (0,min{ 1Rj , 1}).
Conversely, if there exists s′i ∈ (0,min{ 1Rj , 1}) such that Ui(s
′
i, c) < 0, then Ui(s
′
i, c) < Ui(0, c) for all
si ∈ (0,min{ 1Rj , 1}).
Consider first the case where Rj ≤ 1. The fact that there exists no equilibrium in which si ∈
(0,min{ 1Rj , 1}) implies that if Rj ≤ 1, then player i’s optimal choice is si = 1 if his utility following the
subsequent equilibrium play is positive (i.e., if Ψ > 0) and the optimal choice is si = 0 otherwise (as this
message guarantees a utility level of zero). We know from the analysis of simultaneous communication
that if RiRj ≥ 1 ≥ Rj , then there exists an equilibrium in which si = 1 and sj = Rj and hence
the utility of player i is positive in this case and in the corresponding candidate equilibrium under
sequential communication (as subsequent effort levels are identical following simultaneous or sequential
communication of the same pair of messages). Therefore if RiRj ≥ 1 ≥ Rj , then si = 1 is a unique best
reply and there is a unique equilibrium in which si = 1 and sj = Rj . This equilibrium under sequential
communication yields the same utility levels and payoffs to both players as that under simultaneous
communication. If RiRj < 1 then there exists either a unique equilibrium in which si = 1 and sj = Rj
or a unique equilibrium in which si = 0 and sj = 0. In the latter case, the utility levels and payoffs are
the same as under simultaneous communication. In the former case, they are strictly greater for both
players.
Consider next the case in which Rj > 1. We have thus far shown that i’s best reply is either 0 or
in [ 1Rj , 1]. We first consider the optimal choice of message from the interval [
1
Rj
, 1]. For all si ∈ [ 1Rj , 1],
j’s best reply is fixed, sj = 1. Player i chooses his message taking j’s choice as given, which is the
23In the case where Θk = 0 and [λl = 0 or Rl = 0] for k = i or k = j, multiple equilibria are possible. Our results are
invariant to what is assumed about equilibrium selection in this case. For ease of exposition, we assume that players in this
case play si = 1 and sj = 0.
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same optimisation problem as under simultaneous communication. From Section 4.3 we know that i’s
best reply from this interval is therefore si = min
{
max{Ri, 1Rj }, 1
}
. From Section 4.3 we know that if
min (Ri, Rj) ≥ 1, then there exists an equilibrium under simultaneous communication in which si = sj =
1 and both players achieve positive utility. This implies that if Ri ≥ 1 (and hence min (Ri, Rj) ≥ 1) then
there is a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium under sequential communication in which si = sj = 1.
If Ri < 1 and RiRj ≥ 1 > Ri then i’s optimal choice is Ri so long as this yields positive utility. We
know from Section 4.3 that if RiRj ≥ 1 > Ri then there exists an equilibrium under simultaneous
communication in which si = Ri and sj = 1 and hence the same messages form part of the unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium with sequential communication. This equilibrium yields the same utility
levels and payoffs to both players as under simultaneous communication. If RiRj < 1 then Ri < 1Rj and
there exists either a unique equilibrium in which si = 1Rj and sj = 1 or a unique equilibrium in which
si = 0 and sj = 0. In the latter case, the utility levels and payoffs are the same as under simultaneous
communication. In the former case, they are strictly greater for both players.
We have therefore seen that if either (Θi ≤ 0 or Θj ≤ 0 [or both]) or (Θi > 0 and Θj > 0 and
RiRj ≥ 1), then there is a unique equilibrium in which (1) players’ payoffs are invariant to whether they
send their message first or second and hence to the method by which nature selects the first mover, and
(2) both players’ messages, efforts, and payoffs are the same as under simultaneous communication. If
Θi > 0 and Θj > 0 and RiRj < 1 and Rj < 1, then in equilibrium either (si = 1 and sj = Rj) or
(si = 0 and sj = 0). If Θi > 0 and Θj > 0 and Rj ≥ 1 > RiRj , then in equilibrium either (si = 1Rj
and sj = 1) or (si = 0 and sj = 0); i.e., when Θi > 0 and Θj > 0 and RiRj < 1 we have that (1)
equilibrium messages, efforts and payoffs may depend on which player is selected to send their message
first, and (2) payoffs may be strictly greater under sequential communication than under simultaneous
communication.
We can now see that under sequential communication,
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
induces the same messages, effort
levels, and payoffs as under simultaneous communication (point 1 of the proposition) by noting that
in the partnership game induced by the pair
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
, by the definition of λ+c we have min (Ri, Rj) ≥
1 =⇒ RiRj ≥ 1. We next establish that
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
remains a strict Nash equilibrium of the population
game (point 4 of the proposition). Consider a deviation to λ′ 6= λ+c . Recall from Lemma 8 that
λ
′ 6= λ+c =⇒
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
/∈ Cl(Λmax) and hence min{Ri, Rj} < 1. First, consider a deviation to λ′ < λ+c .
We show that this implies that for player k, with λk = λ+c , we have that Rk > 1 (with k = i or k = j,
depending on which player is selected to send his message first). To see this, observe that as established
in the proof of Theorem 2 (specifically in Eq. (26)), the set of points satisfying Eq. (25) is convex. If
we can establish that in the game induced by
(
0, λ+c
)
we have Rk > 1, then for λ
′ ∈ [0, λ+c ] we have
that in the game induced by
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
, Rk > 1. Reproducing Eq. (25) but imposing λi = λk = λ+c and
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λj = λ
′ = 0, we have that Rk > 1 if
λ+c >
1
(λ′)2(1− c) + λ′(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2) − c and λ
′
<
2− c2
c− 1
⇐⇒ λ+c >
1
c(2− c2) − c and 0 <
2− c2
c− 1
⇐⇒ 1 + 2c− 2c
2
2(c− 1) +
√
5− 4c
2(c− 1) >
1
c(2− c2) − c,
which holds for all c ∈ [1, 1.25] . Hence we have that Rk > 1. Given that min{Ri, Rj} < 1, we have
that either Ri > 1 > Rj or Rj > 1 > Ri. If Ri > 1 > Rj then as shown above either (1) the payoff in
equilibrium is the same as under simultaneous communication, or (2) there is an equilibrium in which
si = 1 and sj = Rj . If Rj > 1 > Ri then as shown above either (3) the payoff in equilibrium is zero
to both players, or (4) there is an equilibrium in which si = 1Rj and sj = 1. The proof of part 3 of
Theorem 2 shows that for any
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
such that λ′ < λ+c , pi
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
< pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
in the simultaneous
communication setup and therefore, in cases (1) and (3) any deviation yields a strictly lower payoff also
in the sequential setup. The proof of part 3 of Theorem 2 also shows that for any
(
λi, λ
+
c
)
such that
λi ≤ λ+c , if sj = 1 and si = Ri, then pi
(
λi, λ
+
c
)
< pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
. Given that play following any given pair
of messages is the same in both the sequential and simultaneous setups, it is therefore the case that in
case (2) deviation also yields a strictly lower payoff. In case (4), the equilibrium payoff to player i is
given by substituting sj = 1, si = 1Rj , λi = λ
′ , and λj = λ+c into the expressions for the second-stage
effort choices given by Eq. (5) and substituting the resulting expression into Eq. (1). Simplifying the
resulting expression yields 24
[(c(c+ λ′)− 1][c− 3c√5− 4c+ c3(1 +√5− 4c) + c2λ′(1 +√5− 4c)− 2(2 + λ′ +√5− 4cλ′)]
2(1 +
√
5− 4c)(c+ λ′)2 . (55)
The payoff pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
is obtained by substituting λi = λj = λ+c and si = sj = 1 into Eq. (5) and
substituting the resulting expression into Eq. (1). Simplifying the resulting expression yields25
(c− 2)(1 +√5− 4c− 2(c− 1)c)2
2(3 +
√
5− 4c− 2c)2 . (56)
The value of Eq. (56) is strictly greater than that of Eq. (55) for all λ′ < λ+c for all26 c < 1.25. Therefore,
in all possible cases (1), (2), (3) and (4), if λk = λ+c then a deviation by player l from λ+c to λ
′
< λ+c
yields a strictly lower payoff and hence for λ′ < λ+c , we have that pi
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
< pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
.
Next, consider a deviation to λl = λ
′
> λ+c = λk. This implies that Rl > 1 as, given that the
pair
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
satisfies Eq. (25), if λl > λ+c then the pair
(
λ
′
c, λ
+
c
)
must also satisfy Eq. (25) with
l = i and k = j, as λi is increased while λj stays constant. Hence we have that Ri > 1 > Rj or
Rj > 1 > Ri (depending on whether player k or l is selected to play first), and again either (1) the
payoffs in equilibrium are the same as under simultaneous communication, or (2) there is an equilibrium
24This simplification was obtained using Mathematica. The code is available in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
25This simplification was obtained using Mathematica. The code is available in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
26This result is obtained using Mathematica. The code is available in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
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in which si = 1 and sj = Rj , or (3) the payoff in equilibrium is zero to both players, or (4) there is an
equilibrium in which si = 1Rj and sj = 1. Part 3 of Theorem 2 shows that for any
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
such that
λ
′
> λ+c , it is the case that pi
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
< pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
in the simultaneous communication setup, and that
for λi > λ+c and following messages of si = 1 and sj = Rj , the payoff to player i is strictly lower than
pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
. Therefore, in cases (1), (2), and (3), deviation to λ′ > λ+c leads to a strictly lower payoff.
In case (4), the equilibrium payoff to player j (the deviator) is given by substituting si = 1Rj and sj = 1
and λi = λ+c into the expressions for the second-stage effort choices given by Eq. (5) and substituting
the resulting expression into Eq. (1). Simplifying the resulting expression yields27
√
5− 4c+ c− 2
2 +
(3−√5− 4c)(2λ′ + c) + 2(λ′)2
4(c+ λ′)2 . (57)
The value of Eq. (56) is strictly greater than that of Eq. (57) for all λ′ < λ+c for all28 c < 1.25. Therefore
in all possible cases (1), (2), (3) and (4), if λk = λ+c then deviation by player l from λ+c to λ
′
< λ+c yields
a strictly lower payoff and hence for λ′ 6= λ+c we have that pi
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
< pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
and
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
is a
strict equilibrium of the game with sequential communication.
That points 3 and 5 of Theorem 2 also hold in the sequential setup follows from the fact that
pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
is the same under both forms of communication (these results are points 3 and 5 of the
proposition).
Finally, we prove that if c < 1.2, then pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> pi
(
λ
′
, λ
′) for any λ′ 6= λ+c (point 2 of the theorem).
If λi = λj = λ
′ , this implies min{Ri, Rj} ≥ 1 or Ri ·Rj < 1. In the former case, payoffs are the same as
in the game with simultaneous communication, which by point 1 of Theorem 2 are less than pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
.
In the latter case, either the payoffs are the same as in the game with simultaneous communication (and
both players’ payoffs are zero and therefore less than pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
) or there is an equilibrium in which
si = 1 and sj = Rj . In this case material payoffs to players i and j can be obtained by substituting
λi = λj = λ
′ and si = 1 and sj = Rj into Eq. (5) and substituting the resulting expression into Eq. (1)
and the corresponding equation for player j. Letting pii
(
λ
′
, λ
′) denote the payoff to the player selected
to send his message first, we have that
pii
(
λ
′
, λ
′) = (λ′)2(c+ λ′)[1− c(c+ λ′)][2 + (c+ λ′)[−2λ′ + c(c2 + cλ′ − 3)]]2[1 + (c+ λ′)2(−2 + c(c+ λ′))]2 .
Player j’s payoff is
pij
(
λ
′
, λ
′) = (λ′)2(c+ λ′ − 1)(1 + c+ λ′)[c(c+ λ′ − 1)(1 + c+ λ′)− 2λ′ ]2[1 + (c+ λ′)2(−2 + c(c+ λ′))]2 .
By using Mathematica29 we have verified that for all c < 1.2,
pii
(
λ
′
,λ
′
)
+pij
(
λ
′
,λ
′
)
2 = pi
(
λ
′
, λ
′)
<
pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
; i.e., the average payoff to the two players in any candidate equilibrium in which λi = λj = λ
′
and Ri ·Rj < 1 and si = 1 and sj = Rj is strictly less than pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
, which completes the proof.
27This simplification was obtained using Mathematica. The code is available in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
28This result is obtained using Mathematica. The code is available in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
29The code is available in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
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D.10 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. In the exposition of this proof, let pi1(λi, λj) denote the payoff to player i in the unique equilibrium
of the partnership game with one-sided reneging costs (in cases where there are multiple equilibria
that may be selected with positive probability by the equilibrium selection function, pi1(λi, λj) denotes
the expected payoff) and use pi(λi, λj) to denote the payoff in the corresponding two-sided case. We
first derive the second-stage best-reply function under one-sided reneging costs. Individuals have an
expectation of their partner’s effort choice, denoted by µχj . Their expected utility function is
Ui(xi, µχj , si, c) = xiµχj −
cx2i
2 − 1si>xi
λi
2 (si − xi)
2. (58)
Suppose first that si ≤ µχjc . As the sum of the first two terms of the expected utility function, xiµχj−
cx2i
2 ,
is maximised when xi =
µχj
c and the intrinsic cost term, 1si>xi
λi
2 (si−xi)2, is minimised for any xi > si,
we have that the best reply is xi =
µχj
c . Suppose instead that si >
µχj
c . There is no intrinsic cost from
playing xi > si but, due to the concavity of utility in xi, there is a loss induced to the material payoff
and so xi = si dominates all xi > si. When a player optimises over xi ∈ [0, si], his optimal choice is
characterised by the same first-order condition and so we have the same best-reply function as in the
case of two-sided reneging costs (given by Eq. (4)). Players therefore always choose pure strategies. The
second-stage best-reply function is therefore:
x∗i (xj , si, sj , λi, λj , c) =

xj
c if si ≤
xj
c
xj + λisi
c+ λi
if si >
xj
c
. (59)
For expositional convenience and without loss of generality, in writing this best-reply function we have
imposed that players choose pure strategies. We can deduce from the best-reply function the following
facts. (1) In any equilibrium either si > xi or sj > xj i.e., at most one player reneges upwards in
equilibrium. To see why (1) is true, suppose that si ≤ xi and sj ≤ xj . If, for some i, si > xjc , then
x∗i =
xj + λisi
c+ λi
<
c· si + λisi
c+ λi
= si which is a contradiction. If instead si ≤ xjc and sj ≤ xic , then
xi = xjc > xj and xj =
xi
c > xi, which is also a contradiction. (2) By comparing the best-reply function
to Eq. (4), we see that in any equilibrium in which both players renege downwards, effort choices are the
same function of the player’s message and the opponent’s effort choice as in the model with two-sided
reneging costs and hence equilibrium effort choices when both players renege downwards are the same
function of first-stage messages as in the two-sided model. (3) In any equilibrium in which a player, i,
reneges upwards, we have that si < xi = xjc < xj =
xi + λjsj
c+ λj
< sj , which implies the following effort
choices in equilibrium:
xei (xj , si, sj , λi, λj , c) =
λj
c2 + cλj − 1sj ≡ αisj (60)
xej(xi, si, sj , λi, λj , c) =
λj
c+ λj − 1c
sj ≡ cαisj . (61)
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Note that αi < 1. Therefore, a pair of first-stage messages (si, sj) induce a second-stage equilibrium in
which one player, i, reneges upward only if si ≤ αisj . In what follows we show that for any (λi, λj),
αi < Ri. Either Θi ≤ 0, and so by definition Ri =∞ > 1 > αi, or Θi > 0, in which case
αi < Ri
⇐⇒αi < λjΘi
⇐⇒ λj
c2 + cλj − 1 <
λj
c(c+ λj) + 1(c+λi)(c+λj) − 2
⇐⇒c(c+ λj) + 1(c+ λi)(c+ λj) − 2 < c
2 + cλj − 1
⇐⇒c2 + cλj + 1(c+ λi)(c+ λj) − 2 < c
2 + cλj − 1
⇐⇒ 1(c+ λi)(c+ λj) < 1, (62)
which always holds as c > 1.
We can now show that for any (λi, λj) the only candidate equilibrium in which both players renege
downward induces the same effort levels as in the unique equilibrium with two-sided reneging costs.
Consider a candidate equilibrium in which both players renege downward, i.e., αisj < si and αjsi < sj .
This implies that si ∈ (αisj ,min{ sjαj , 1}] and sj ∈ (αjsi,min{
si
αi
, 1}]. Lemma 3 implies that in the
two-sided game, conditional on reneging downward, each player i’s best reply is si = min{Risj , 1}.
Given that for both players, i, Risj > αisj and αjsi < 1, their optimal choice of message in the game
with one-sided reneging costs, conditional on reneging downward, must satisfy s∗i = min{Risj , sjαj , 1}. If
min{Ri, Rj} > 1 then this implies s∗i > sj or s∗i = 1 for both players i, and this is jointly satisfied only
if s∗i = s∗j = 1, which is the same choice of messages as in the corresponding game with two-sided costs.
If Ri ·Rj > 1 > Rj , then we have that s∗j = Rjsi. Rearranging s∗j = Rjsi we obtain
si =
sj
Rj
<
sj
αj
(63)
and
si =
sj
Rj
<
sj
Rj
Ri ·Rj = Risj , (64)
where the inequality in Eq. (64) follows given that Ri ·Rj > 1. Eq. (63) and Eq. (64) are consistent with
i’s optimal choice only if s∗i = 1. We therefore have that if Ri · Rj > 1 > Rj then s∗i = 1 > Rjsi = s∗j ,
which implies the same messages and effort choices as in the game with two-sided reneging costs. If
Ri · Rj = 1, a continuum of candidate equilibria survive in which messages satisfy s∗i = s∗j and effort
levels correspond to those in the equilibria of the game with two-sided reneging costs. In the case where
Ri = Rj = 1 we make the assumption, made also in the model with two-sided costs, that the equilibrium
selected is that in which si = sj = 1. Finally, consider the case where Ri · Rj < 1. Assume without
loss of generality that Ri < 1. Given that Ri > αi for both players i, we have that s∗i = Risj and
s∗j = min{Rjsi, 1}. Suppose that s∗j = 1; then s∗i = Ri and s∗j = Ri · Rj < 1, which is a contradiction.
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Suppose instead that s∗j = Rjsi < 1; then s∗i = Risj = Ri · Rj · si < si, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, the only equilibrium candidate in which players renege (weakly) downward is that where
si = sj = xi = xj = 0; i.e., the messages and effort levels are the same as in the unique equilibrium of
the game with two-sided costs. We have therefore seen that in all possible cases, the messages and effort
choices in the unique candidate equilibrium where both players renege downwards are the same as those
in the unique equilibrium of the corresponding game with two-sided reneging costs.
We next show that for any (λi, λj) there are two candidate continua of equilibria (one for each
player), where the effort choices are the same within each continuum, and one player reneges upwards.
Suppose that there is an equilibrium in which player i reneges upward and sj < 1. Player j must
achieve positive utility in equilibrium (otherwise he could do better by playing sj = xj = 0). Since both
players’ effort choices are linear functions of sj , for choices of message that satisfy si ≤ αisj , substituting
these linear functions into the utility function implies that j’s utility is a linear function of s2j whenever
si ≤ αisj . This implies that deviating to sj = 1 yields higher utility for player j. Thus, we are left
with two candidate continua of equilibria in which one player reneges upward. These are strategies that
satisfy (for each player i) si ≤ αisj = αi, with second-stage best replies as given in Eq. (60) and Eq.
(61). Note that the effort levels of the player in any of these candidate equilibria are independent of si
(conditional on its being less than αi) and, therefore, they are the same in all candidate equilibria in the
same continuum. Note by comparing to Eq. (5) that the effort levels of both players are the same as in
all equilibria of the partnership game with two-sided reneging costs where λi = 0.
We now analyse the game with levels of reneging aversion (λ+c , λ+c ) and show that there is a unique
equilibrium in which the messages and effort levels are the same as in the two-sided reneging cost game.
We know that the only candidate equilibrium in which both players renege downward must involve the
same choice of messages and effort levels as in the two-sided game. This candidate equilibrium is the
one where si = sj = 1. We now show that this candidate equilibrium is a subgame-perfect equilibrium
by showing that neither player would wish to deviate to any message that would induce them to renege
upwards in the second stage (i.e., a player, i, would not want to deviate to si ≤ αisj). We obtain the
utility of player i as a function of c, in the candidate equilibrium by substituting λi = λj = λ+c and
si = sj = 1 and the equation for second-stage effort levels as a function of first-stage messages (Eq. (5))
into the utility function. Simplifying the resulting expression yields30
Ui(c) =
c(
√
5− 4c− 1) + 2
4 . (65)
We obtain the utility of player i as a function of c in the case where he deviates to si < αi by substituting
sj = 1 and the equations for second-stage effort levels as a function of sj (Eq. (60) and Eq. (61)) into
the utility function. Simplifying the resulting expression yields31
Ui(c) =
c(
√
5− 4c− 2c+ 3)
4 . (66)
30This simplification was obtained using Mathematica. Code available in the supplementary appendix accompanying this
paper.
31This simplification was obtained using Mathematica. The code is available in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
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Therefore, the deviation is not profitable if
c(
√
5− 4c− 1) + 2
4 >
c(
√
5− 4c− 2c+ 3)
4
⇐⇒2− c > 3c− 2c2
⇐⇒2 + 2c2 > 4c (67)
⇐⇒1 + c2 > 2c. (68)
This holds for all c ∈ (1, 1.25), and thus with reneging aversion (λ+c , λ+c ) there exists a subgame-perfect
equilibrium with one-sided reneging costs in which si = sj = 1 and si > xi and sj > xj ; i.e., there exists
an equilibrium with messages and effort levels that are the same as those in the standard game with
two-sided costs. The foregoing reasoning also implies that none of the candidate equilibria in which one
player reneges upward are subgame-perfect equilibria. To see this, note first that, for any candidate
equilibrium with (si, sj) such that si < αisj < sj ∈ (0, 1], the utility is equal to the expression in Eq.
(66) multiplied by s2j . Note also that utility from deviating to si = sj is equal to the expression in Eq.
(65) multiplied by s2j . Therefore, player i will deviate from such an equilibrium. Therefore the subgame-
perfect equilibrium with levels of reneging aversion (λ+c , λ+c ) is unique and is such that si = sj = 1 and
si > xi and sj > xj and the material payoffs are the same as in the standard game with two-sided
reneging costs and hence pi1(λ+c , λ+c ) = pi(λ+c , λ+c ). This completes the proof of parts 1, 3, and 5 of the
proposition.
We now demonstrate that (λ+c , λ+c ) remains a strict Nash equilibrium of the population game under
one-sided reneging costs (part 4 of the proposition). We established that for any (λ′ , λ+c ) with λ
′ 6=
λ+c the only possible equilibria of the one-sided partnership game involve either both players reneging
downward, or exactly one player reneging upward. In the former case, the effort levels are the same as
in the corresponding equilibria of the two-sided game; thus, since pi(λ+c , λ+c ) > pi(λ
′
, λ+c ), we have that
pi1(λ+c , λ+c ) > pi1(λ
′
, λ+c ). In the case where one player, i, reneges upward, the equilibrium effort levels
are of the form given by Eq. (60) and Eq. (61). Note that if any candidate equilibrium yields positive
payoff to a player then the highest possible payoff for that player is obtained in the candidate equilibrium
where sj = 1. By inspection of Eq. (60) and Eq. (61) we see that the equilibrium efforts when sj = 1
are the same as those in the equilibrium of the two-sided game where λi = 0; i.e., if (λi, λj) induces
an equilibrium in which player i reneges upward, then pi1(λi, λj) = pi(0, λj). We know from Theorem
2 that pi(λ+c , λ+c ) > pi(0, λ+c ). Therefore, for any (λi, λ+c ) that induces an equilibrium in which player i
reneges upward in the one-sided game, we have that pi1(λi, λ+c ) = pi(0, λ+c ) < pi(λ+c , λ+c ) = pi1(λ+c , λ+c ).
Finally, consider any (λi, λ+c ) that induces player j to renege upward. In this case, i’s payoff in the most
profitable possible equilibrium is obtained by imposing sj = 1 on Eq. (60) and Eq. (61) and substituting
the resulting expressions into the expression for the material payoff (Eq. (1) yields
[
λi
c+ λi − 1c
]2
(1
c
− c2) =
(c2 − 2)cλ2i
2 (c(c+ λi)− 1)2
. (69)
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A deviation from (λ+c , λ+c ) that induces such an equilibrium gains a weakly greater payoff only if
(c2 − 2)cλ2i
2 (c(c+ λi)− 1)2
≥ c(
√
5− 4c− 1) + 2
4 ,
which never holds for c ∈ (1, 1.25) and32 λi ≥ 0. Therefore, pi1(λ+c , λ+c ) > pi1(λ
′
, λ+c ) for all λ
′ 6= λ+c
such that (λ′ , λ+c ) induces an equilibrium in which one player reneges upward. We have therefore seen
that for all (λ′ , λ+c ), in all possible equilibria of the induced partnership game with one-sided reneging
costs, the payoff achieved by a player with reneging aversion λ′ is strictly lower than the payoff in the
unique equilibrium under (λ+c , λ+c ). Therefore, regardless of the equilibrium selection function underlying
pi1(λ′ , λ+c ), we have that pi1(λ+c , λ+c ) > pi1(λ
′
, λ+c ) for all λ
′ 6= λ+c .
Finally, we show that if c < 1.22, then pi1
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> pi1
(
λ
′
, λ
′) for all λ′ 6= λ+c (point 2 of the
proposition). If λi = λj = λ
′ then min{Ri, Rj} ≥ 1 or Ri · Rj < 1. In the former case, the payoffs are
the same as in the game with two-sided reneging costs, which by point 1 of Theorem 2 are less than
pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
. In the latter case, there are three possibilities: (1) the payoffs are the same as in the game
with two-sided reneging costs (and both players’ payoffs are zero and therefore less than pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
);
(2) there is a symmetric pair of continua of equilibria in which one player reneges upward. In one
si = 1 > αj ≥ sj and in the other sj = 1 > αi ≥ si; (3) there exist two continua of equilibria of the
same form as in (2), plus a third equilibrium in which effort levels are zero. If equilibria in which one
player reneges upward exist, these must yield positive payoffs to both players. We show that, whatever
equilibrium selection function is assumed, pi1
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> pi1
(
λ
′
, λ
′). We do this by considering the
equilibrium selection functions that yield the highest possible expected payoff. This is any function
putting full weight on the two equilibria where one player reneges upward (as the payoffs in the third
possible equilibrium are zero for both players). In Section 7 we make the assumption that in cases with
symmetric levels of reneging aversion, if an asymmetric equilibrium is selected, pi1
(
λ
′
, λ
′) is the average
of the equilibrium payoffs of players in the two roles (denoted by i and j). To obtain the payoff function
pi1
(
λ
′
, λ
′) we therefore impose sj = 1 on Eq. (60) and Eq. (61) and substitute the resulting expressions
into Eq. (1), and its equivalent for player j, to give the payoffs for the two roles. We then take the
average to yield the payoff:
pi1
(
λ
′
, λ
′) = cα2i2 + cα
2
i
2 −
cα2i
4 −
c3α2i
4 = cα
2
i −
(c+ c3)α2i
4 =
(3c− c3)α2i
4 .
We next note that αi is an increasing function of λ
′ and hence the payoff function is increasing in λ′ .
We therefore consider the limit of the payoff as λ′ →∞. This is given by
lim
λ′→∞
(3c− c3)α2i
4 =
(3c− c3)
4 limλ′→∞
[
λ
′
c2 + cλ′ − 1
]2
= (3c− c
3)
4 [
1
c
]2 = 3− c
2
4c .
This is the same payoff that obtained under sequential effort choices (with no reneging costs), as derived
in point 4 of Theorem 2. As shown in Theorem 2, this is strictly less than the payoff pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
if
c < 1.22, yielding the result.
32This result was obtained using Mathematica. The code is available in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
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D.11 Proof of Proposition 5
Fix c ∈ (1, 2). Let 0 < β+c ≡ 12·c + c2 − 1 = 12 ·
(
1
c + c
)
− 1. Consider the partnership game with fixed
reneging costs βi = βj = β+c . For each player i, let x∗i : [0, 1]
2 → [0, 1] be a (pure) second-stage strategy
that satisfies: (1) x∗i (1, 1) = 1 (i.e., a player exerts maximal effort if both players promise maximal
effort), and (2) for each (si, sj) 6= (1, 1), define x∗ in an arbitrary way such that for each pair of messages
(si, sj), the effort x∗i (si, sj) is a best reply to the effort x∗i (sj , si).
In what follows we show that
(
(1, 1) ,
(
x∗i , x∗j
))
is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. We begin
by showing that both players exerting maximal effort constitutes a second-stage Nash equilibrium of
the subgame following the promises si = sj = 1. Assume that the opponent exerts maximal effort
in this subgame. If the player exerts maximal effort his payoff is equal to Ui (1, 1, 1, c) = 1 − 0.5 · c.
Conditional on exerting a nonmaximal effort (and reneging on the agent’s promise), the payoff of the
agent is maximised when exerting an effort of 1c (by analogous arguments to those presented in Section
4.2), and it is equal to
Ui
(1
c
, 1, 1, c
)
= 1
c
− 12 · c − β
+
c =
1
2 · c −
( 1
2 · c +
c
2 − 1
)
= 1− c2 = Ui (1, 1, 1, c) .
Thus, the agent obtains his maximal payoff by exerting maximal effort in this subgame.
Next, we show that in any subgame in which the agent (player i) has promised maximal effort, while
the opponent (player j) has promised less than maximal effort, sj < 1, the agent’s exerted effort is non-
maximal and equal to 1c times the opponent’s effort in any second-stage Nash equilibrium of the induced
subgame. In order to see this, observe first that the opponent (player j) will never exert effort xj strictly
higher than max
(
sj ,
1
c
)
< 1 in any Nash equilibrium of this subgame because a strictly higher effort
xj > max
(
sj ,
1
c
)
< 1 yields the agent a suboptimal subjective payoff which is equal to a non-optimal
material payoff minus the reneging cost. Thus, xj < 1 in any Nash equilibrium of the subgame following
messages (1, sj < 1). If the agent keeps his promise and exerts a maximal effort his payoff is equal to
Ui (1, xj , 1, c) = xj − 0.5 · c. Conditional on reneging on his promise, the agent’s best reply is to exert an
effort of 1c · xj , which yields a payoff of
Ui
(1
c
· xj , xj , 1, c
)
= 1
c
· x2j −
x2j
2 · c − β
+
c =
x2j
2 · c −
( 1
2 · c +
c
2 − 1
)
= 1− c2 −
1− x2j
2 · c .
Observe that the difference in the payoffs, Ui
(
1
c · xj , xj , 1, c
)
− Ui (1, xj , 1, c), is equal to
Ui
(1
c
· xj , xj , 1, c
)
− Ui (1, xj , 1, c) = 1− c2 −
1− x2j
2 · c − (xj − 0.5 · c)
= 1− xj − (1− xj) (1 + xj)2 · c = (1− xj) ·
(
1− 1 + xj2 · c
)
> 0,
where the latter inequality is due to 1 + xj < 1 + 1 < 2 < 2 · c. This implies that the agent exerts
an effort of 1c · xj < xj in any Nash equilibrium an induced subgame following a promise of less than
maximal effort by the opponent.
Next, observe that the opponent’s (player j’s) payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the induced subgame
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following a promise of less than maximal effort by the opponent and a promise of maximal effort by the
player (player i) is equal to
Uj
(
xj ,
1
c
· xj , sj , c
)
≤ pii
(
xj ,
1
c
· xj , c
)
= 1
c
· x2j −
c · x2j
2 < 1− 0.5 · c = Uj (1, 1, 1, c) , (70)
which implies that the first-stage best reply of the opponent to the agent’s promise of maximal effort is
to promise maximal effort as well. This shows that
(
(1, 1) ,
(
x∗i , x∗j
))
is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of
the partnership game with fixed reneging costs βi = βj = β+c . Moreover, observe that Eq. (70) implies
that promising maximal effort is the unique best reply to an agent who promises maximal effort with
a sufficiently high probability (yet, strictly below one), which implies that promising maximal effort
remains the unique best reply also to an agent who plays a slightly perturbed strategy by playing a full-
support strategy that assigns a high probability to the maximal message in the first stage, which implies
that
(
(1, 1) ,
(
x∗i , x∗j
))
is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the partnership game with fixed reneging costs
βi = βj = β+c .
D.12 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Parts (1), (2), and (4) of Proposition 6 are immediate from the fact that equilibrium payoffs remain
the same as in the baseline model of full observability. We have to prove that for each c ∈ (1, 1.25), there
exists q¯ < 1 such that (λ+c , λ+c ) is a strict Nash equilibrium of the population game with observability q
for each q ∈ [q¯, 1), i.e., piq
(
λ′, λ+c |λ+c
)
< pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
for all λ′ 6= λ+c . We first note that by Lemma 8, for
any λ′ 6= λ+c , we have that (λ′, λ+c ) /∈ Cl(Λmax). If (λ′, λ+c ) ∈ Λ0−eff , the material payoff to both players
is zero and hence any mutant λ′ such that G(λ′, λ+c ) induces a no-effort equilibrium achieves a strictly
lower material payoff than the incumbent type λ+c in encounters where levels of reneging aversion are
observed. In the proof of Theorem 2 it was shown that when λ′ ≤ λ+c , the derivative is equal to (the left
derivative when λ′ = λ+c ):
∂pi
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
∂λ′
= [λ
+
c ]2(c(λ+c + c)− 1)2
[1 + (c+ λ+c )(c+ λ′)(c(λ+c + c)− 2)]3 (71)
and that this expression is always strictly positive for c ∈ (1, 1.25). In particular, this implies that
lim
λ′↗λ+c
∂pi
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
∂λ′
> 0. (72)
The fact that the derivative of the material payoff function with respect to λ′ is strictly positive for
all λ′ < λ+c and that the left derivative at λ+c is bounded away from zero implies that when levels of
reneging aversion are observed and (λ′, λ+c ) ∈ Λ2−msg, there is a first-order material payoff loss for a
mutant with λ′ < λ+c , compared to the incumbent type λ+c . Now, considering the case where λ
′
> λ+c and
(λ′, λ+c ) ∈ Λ2−msg, we note that, analogously, in the proof of Theorem 2 it was shown that when λ
′ ≥ λ+c ,
the derivative of the payoff function with respect to λ′ is strictly negative and the right derivative of the
payoff function, evaluated at λ+c , is strictly negative; i.e., the payoff increases as λ
′ decreases toward λ+c
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(Mathematica code demonstrating this is available in the online appendix). Therefore, there is also a
first-order loss for a mutant with λ′ > λ+c when reneging costs are observed.
We have therefore demonstrated that any mutant achieves a strictly lower payoff in the partnership
games played after reneging costs are observed as compared to an incumbent, i.e., pi
(
λ′, λ+c
)
< pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
for all λ′ 6= λ+c , and, further, that the first-order loss of a mutant is bounded away from zero when
λ
′ → λ+c .
Next, we note that in the case where reneging costs are not observed, piq
(
λ′, λ+c |λ+c
)− piq (λ+c , λ+c ) is
bounded from above by a uniform bound. To see this, note that the maximum material payoff achievable
in a partnership game is
1
c
− c(
1
c )2
2 =
1
2c .
The payoff differential between a mutant of type λ′ and an incumbent of type λ+c when reneging
costs are observed can therefore be given by q· [pi (λ′, λ+c )− pi (λ+c , λ+c )] . The maximum positive payoff
differential between a mutant of type λ′, relative to λ+c when reneging costs are not observed, is (1−q)· 12c .
Therefore, the maximum payoff differential between a mutant type and an incumbent type under partial
observability is
q· [pi
(
λ′, λ+c
)
− pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
] + (1− q) 12c . (73)
We therefore have that a mutant of type λ′ is strictly outperformed by an incumbent of type λ+c when
Eq. (73) is strictly negative. Imposing this strict negativity and rearranging for q yields
q >
1
1 + 2c[pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
− pi
(
λ′, λ+c
)
]
≡ q˜λ′ (74)
From the fact that the term in square brackets in the denominator of Eq. (74) is strictly positive, it is
immediate that q˜λ′ ∈ (0, 1). We then define q¯ ≡ sup
{
q˜λ′ : λ′ ∈ R+
}
. It follows that for all c ∈ (1, 1.25),
there exists q¯ such that for all q ∈ [q¯, 1], (λ+c , λ+c ) is a strict Nash equilibrium of the population game
with partial observability.
The stable population in the setting with partial observability has been proven to be identical to the
population in the setting with perfect observability. Therefore, results 1, 2, and 4 of Theorem 2 that
pertain to the payoffs of this stable population hold also in the partial observability setting.
D.13 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. If the incumbents have λ = 0, then they exert no effort by Fact 1. If the incumbents have
λ > 0, then assume to the contrary that agents exert a positive level of effort on the equilibrium
path. By Theorem 1, this implies that all agents make the maximal promise 1 and, due to the payoff
function being strictly convex, that they exert the same positive level of effort xei (1, 1, λ, λ, c) > 0 on
the equilibrium path in the second stage (see Eq. (5)). Consider a mutant with zero reneging cost who
sends message 1 and then exerts effort 1c ·xei (1, 1, λ, λ, c). It is immediate that such a mutant achieves a
strictly higher payoff than the incumbents because the mutant exerts the unique amount of effort that
maximises the payoff, given that the partner exerts effort xei (1, 1, λ, λ, c).
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D.14 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. We show that there can be no symmetric pure Nash equilibrium of the population game in which
players exert no effort on the equilibrium path. Consider any symmetric population in which players
have a level of reneging aversion λ and in which, in game G(λ, λ), the unique equilibrium is a no-effort
equilibrium and hence all players achieve a material payoff of zero, i.e., pi(λ, λ) = 0. Lemma 7 implies
that for any such λ, there exists λ′ such that in G(λ, λ′) - the partnership game played where players of
type λ and type λ′ meet and observe each other’s level of reneging aversion - both players exert positive
effort in equilibrium and achieve strictly positive material payoffs. As any player can always guarantee
a level of utility of at least zero in any interaction, a player of type λ′ achieves a weakly positive payoff
from the partnership game played after players of types λ and λ′ meet but do not observe each other’s
level of reneging aversion. Therefore, when q > 0 (i.e., players in a population observe each other’s level
of reneging aversion at least some of the time), any mutant of type λ′ achieves a strictly positive payoff
in the population game with partial observability, i.e., piq
(
λ
′
, λ|λ
)
> 0 = pi(λ, λ).
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